Compressor station facility failure modes: causes, taxonomy and effects by FIORAVANTI ANDREA et al.
 
 
 
Compressor Station Facility Failure 
Modes: Causes, Taxonomy and Effects 
Fioravanti, A. 
De Simone, G. 
Carpignano, A. 
Ruzzone, A. 
Mortarino, G. 
Piccini, M. 
Calisto, H. (Editor) 
Kopustinskas, V. (Editor) 
Bolado-Lavín, R. (Editor) 
2020 
EUR 30265 EN 
 
 
This publication is a report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s science and knowledge service. It aims to 
provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking process. The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy 
position of the European Commission. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is 
responsible for the use that might be made of this publication. For information on the methodology and quality underlying the data used 
in this publication for which the source is neither Eurostat nor other Commission services, users should contact the referenced source. The 
designations employed and the presentation of material on the maps do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part 
of the European Union concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation 
of its frontiers or boundaries. 
 
Contact information: 
Name: Ricardo BOLADO LAVÍN 
Address: European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), Westerduinweg 3, Petten, The Netherlands 
Email: Ricardo.BOLADO-LAVIN@ec.europa.eu 
Tel.: +31(0)224565349 
 
EU Science Hub 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc 
 
 
JRC120149 
 
EUR 30265 EN 
 
 
PDF ISBN 978-92-76-19810-9 ISSN 1831-9424 doi:10.2760/67609 
 
 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2020 
 
© European Union, 2020  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The reuse policy of the European Commission is implemented by the Commission Decision 2011/833/EU of 12 December 2011 on the 
reuse of Commission documents (OJ L 330, 14.12.2011, p. 39). Except otherwise noted, the reuse of this document is authorised under 
the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). This means that 
reuse is allowed provided appropriate credit is given and any changes are indicated. For any use or reproduction of photos or other 
material that is not owned by the EU, permission must be sought directly from the copyright holders. 
 
All content © European Union, 2020, except: Cover (Jackson School of Geosciences, The University of Texas at Austin)  
 
How to cite this report: Fioravanti, A. et al., Compressor Station Facility Failure Modes: Causes, Taxonomy and Effects, EUR 30265 EN, 
Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2020, ISBN 978-92-76-19810-9, doi:10.2760/67609, JRC120149. 
 
i 
Contents 
Foreword ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 
1 Introduction..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 
2 Taxonomy ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 
2.1 Objective, Sources of Information and Relevant EU Compressor Stations ......................................................................... 5 
2.2 Methodology..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 
3 Internal Security Risk Scenarios Identification and Characterization .................................................................................................. 14 
3.1 Scope and Methodology ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 14 
3.1.1 Functional Analysis ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 14 
3.1.2 Critical elements identification for Gas Compression Stations ................................................................................. 15 
3.1.3 Damage Classes Identification ................................................................................................................................................................. 15 
3.1.4 Components Modelling ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 15 
3.1.5 Fault Tree Analysis................................................................................................................................................................................................ 16 
3.2 Functional Analysis ................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 17 
3.2.1 Gas Compression Station ............................................................................................................................................................................... 17 
3.3 Critical element identification for Gas Compression Stations ...................................................................................................... 22 
3.3.1 Availability study applied to an existing gas compression station ......................................................................... 22 
3.3.2 Historical Investigation ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 24 
3.4 Damage Classes ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 25 
3.4.1 Gas Compression Stations/ UGS Facilities ..................................................................................................................................... 26 
3.4.2 LNG Facilities .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 28 
3.5 Components Modelling ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 29 
3.6 Fault Tree Analysis .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 32 
3.6.1 System modelling by Fault trees ............................................................................................................................................................ 32 
3.6.2 Reliability Analysis ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 38 
3.6.3 Criticality ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 40 
3.7 Results and Conclusions .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 48 
4 Natural Hazards ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 52 
4.1 Scope and methodology .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 52 
4.2 Historical investigation ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 52 
4.2.1 Gas Compressor Stations ............................................................................................................................................................................... 52 
4.2.2 UGS Sites........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 55 
4.2.3 LNG Facilities .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 56 
4.3 Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 59 
4.3.1 Expert judgement ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 60 
4.4 Natural Hazard classification in EU ........................................................................................................................................................................ 60 
 
ii 
4.4.1 Seismic ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 61 
4.4.2 Flooding ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 64 
4.4.3 Lightning ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 66 
4.5 Estimation of worsening factors ............................................................................................................................................................................... 67 
4.5.1 Model ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 67 
4.5.1.1 Seismic................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 68 
4.5.1.2 Flooding ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 72 
4.5.1.3 Lightning ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 74 
4.5.2 Example of application ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 75 
4.6 Results and conclusions ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 78 
5 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 79 
References ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 80 
List of abbreviations and definitions ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 82 
List of figures ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 83 
List of tables ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Foreword 
Compressor stations are key active elements of gas transmission networks. Their role consists in pressurising 
natural gas to overcome pressure drops due to friction, positive slopes and demand nodes, and make possible 
the transport of gas along transmission pipelines. Their partial or total failure may endanger the transport of 
gas, the network not being able to supply the required quantities of gas to demand nodes at the right delivery 
pressure. The importance of these facilities has been the driver in developing this pioneering study on failure 
modes, their causes, taxonomy and possible effects. This work was developed by contractors Tractebel and 
RAMS&E, with the collaboration, support and critical review of JRC staff. The work was developed within the 
competitive Action CIPS 2012, between DG-HOME and DG-JRC to address Critical Energy infrastructure 
protection. 
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Abstract 
This report addresses the failure modes of compressor stations as key facilities of gas transmission networks. 
This is done by finding possible failure causes, establishing a taxonomy and identifying possible effects. Given 
the interest of this study to analyse and identify potential critical facilities in gas transmission networks, and 
their possible impact on energy security, loss of capacity (partial or total) has been identified as the effect of 
interest of the different failures. Probabilistic results provided are unavailability, expected number of failures 
per year, downtime and average downtime.    
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1 Introduction 
Compressor stations are key active elements of gas transmission networks. Their role consists in pressurising 
natural gas to overcome pressure drops due to friction, positive slopes and demand nodes, and make possible 
the transport of gas along transmission pipelines. Their partial or total failure may endanger the transport of 
gas, the network not being able to supply the required quantities of gas to demand nodes at the right delivery 
pressure. Under some circumstances, compressor stations (CS) could be considered critical facilities within the 
natural gas infrastructure. The objective of this study is to identify all significant failure modes of compressor 
stations, their causes and possible effect on gas transport. Another objective is to establish a taxonomy of 
this type of facilities that may simplify reliability estimates. 
This study was based on the review of 56 compressor stations located in different countries of the EU 
(Germany, France, Spain, Poland, the Czech Republic and Austria). This has helped identifying the most 
frequent layouts, based on which the classification of CS has been developed. Basic probabilistic failure rates 
of components have been extracted from different data sources and databases. The analysis of the operation 
of compressor stations and the possible impact of failures led to the consideration of loss of capacity as the 
main effect of components failures.  
Regardless of the framework where the results of this study can be used, typically either critical infrastructure 
protection or security of gas supply, Risk Assessment is the most adequate methodology, requiring reliability 
estimates in order to be applied. The reliability variables addressed in this study are unavailability, expected 
number of failures per year, downtime and average downtime.     
This report is divided in five sections. After the introduction, the second section addresses the creation of a 
taxonomy of compressor stations. Section 3 is the core of the report, where the scope of the methodology is 
set, the functional analysis and the identification of critical elements are performed, damage classes are 
defined and CS components are modelled. Results are then finally provided, after performing a Fault Tree 
analysis. Section 4 is dedicated to a thorough analysis of natural hazards that can affect negatively 
compressor stations. Section 5 contains the conclusions of the study.      
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2 Taxonomy 
2.1 Objective, Sources of Information and Relevant EU Compressor Stations 
The present section is the establishment of a taxonomy of the most relevant compressor stations types in the 
EU gas transmission network, based on the following basic facility data: 
 Installed compression power; 
 Number of input and output pipelines; 
 Types of prime movers and compressors; 
 Redundancy levels. 
For this purpose, a variety of sources of information have been used in order to collect the necessary data: 
 Technical data and documents from projects where Tractebel Engineering has previously carried out 
design and consultancy services (mainly for Clients in Belgium, France and Italy); 
 Information from Transmission System Operators (TSO) which have close relationships with the 
different Tractebel European offices, e.g. the gas operators part of GDF SUEZ group, Belgium’s Fluxys, 
Italy’s Stogit (SNAM group), the Czech Republic’s Net4Gas or Poland’s Transit Gaz-system S.A.; 
 Interviews with gas compressor station Senior Experts from Italy’s TSO; 
 Websites of European gas operators. 
A total number of 56 compressor stations located all around the European Union have been identified and 
assessed for this study, in particular 9 compressor stations in Germany (Bunde, Eischleben, Lippe, Mallnow, 
Olbernau, Reckrod, Rehden, Reuckersdorf and Weisweiler), 5 compressor stations in Belgium (Berneau, 
Winksele, Weelde, Zeebrugge and Zelzate), 2 compressor stations in France (Etrez and Saint-Avit), 18 
compressor stations in Spain (Alcazar de San Juan, Algete, Almendralejo, Baneros, Chinchilla, Cordoba, 
Crevillente, Denia, Haro, Montesa, Navarra, Paterna, Puertollano, Sevilla, Tivissa, Villar de Arnedo, Zamora and 
Zaragoza), 11 compressor stations in Italy (Enna , Gallese, Istrana, Malborghetto, Masera, Melizzano, Messina, 
Montesano, Poggio Renatico, Tarsia and Terranova), 5 compressor stations in Poland (Ciechanow, Kondratki, 
Szamotuly, Wloclawek and Zambrow), 5 compressor stations in Czech Republic (Breclav, Hostim, Kralice, 
Kourim and Veseli n/L) and 1 compressor station in Austria (Eggendorf). 
Examples of operational facilities are shown in the simplified diagrams of the following pages, in order to give 
a representative set of samples of gas compression stations showing the variety and the flexibility of the 
facilities available in Europe. All figures shown are examples of CS normal operation Process Flow Diagram 
(PFD), which implies stations in a steady state working condition: 
 Valves shown as Normally Open (NO) are Open; 
 Valves shown as Normally Closed (NC) are Closed; 
 Spare machines are in a stand by conditions, which means stopped but ready to start up, with 
standby lube oil circuits fully working, seal gas flowing into turbine and compressors barriers and all 
alarms cleared. 
2.2 Methodology 
The aforementioned basic facility data were obtained from the sources of information described above and 
used to define a taxonomy comprising 8 categories or Equivalent Compressor Stations (ECS). This taxonomy 
was established by making some considerations on the basic facility data, as discussed below. 
Regarding the installed compression power it is possible to draw the conclusion that no general rule exists for 
the choice of the rated power of the prime movers. Prime mover sizing takes into account especially company 
standardizations in use and market evolution, meaning this parameter is not relevant for producing a 
meaningful taxonomy. Furthermore, installed power was not considered a key parameter for the model 
definition since the availability/reliability of the units and their maintenance and repair downtime are not 
dependent upon the units’ number/size and installed power, the relevant aspect being rather the functional 
architecture of the compressor station, i.e. its redundancy level as discussed later. 
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As far as the number of input and output pipelines is concerned, it was decided not to consider this parameter 
in the taxonomy since the battery limit of compressor station is at the suction header and at the discharge 
header according to the data and information analysed, as per the following representation: 
Figure 1 - Battery Limits. 
 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
Because of the presence of this inlet and outlet manifold (ring), plant reliability and availability are 
independent from the number of input/output pipelines.  
Regarding the type of primes movers and compressors, all natural gas compressors encountered are driven 
either by electric motors or gas turbines, these possibilities being the key parameters in characterizing 
compressor stations given the fact they introduce significant differences regarding maintenance issues, 
downtime repairs and the different numbers of parts that can fail. Since steam turbines are very rare they will 
not be considered (only one steam turbine was encountered in the survey mentioned above, at Mallnow in 
Germany). Two examples of compressors moved by an electric motor or a gas turbine are illustrated in 
Figures 2 and 3. 
Figure 2 – Motocompressor. 
 
Figure 3 – Turbocompressor. 
 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
Only centrifugal compressors were considered in the present document. This decision was made based on the 
compressor coverage chart presented in Figure 4 (Gas Processors Suppliers Association, 2004), where the 
actual inlet flow is shown on the x-axis and the discharge pressure on the y-axis. All the compressor stations 
considered here present the following characteristics: 
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 Flow rate between 100 and 1000m3/min (at 25°C and 45 barg), corresponding to a range between 
294.000 and 2.940.000 Sm3/h; 
 Discharge pressure equal to 7500 kPa(g), 
A centrifugal multistage compressor is in fact the only possible choice, as borne out by the observation of the 
numerous facilities covered in this study, where no reciprocating compressor is present. Whenever the 
compressor flow is mentioned in this document, reference is made to the nominal or design flow.  
The compressor design flow is related to the normal operating condition of the machine, defined in as the 
condition at which usual operation is expected and optimum efficiency is desired. This point is usually the 
point at which the vendor certifies that performance is within the tolerances stated. Such a condition will 
henceforth be designated as “100% flow”. The design flow, following good engineering practice, is normally 
centred in the performance curve as detailed in Figure 5 and Table 1. 
Figure 4 - Compressor chart. 
 
Source: GPSA, 2004. 
Figure 5 - Typical centrifugal compressor performance curve 
 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
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Table 1 - Compressor operational limits 
Surge 0.75 x Normal Flow 
Design Point Normal Flow 
Stonewall 1.2 x Normal Flow 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
Another important factor is the redundancy level of the compressor station. By analysing the information 
available and extrapolating when data is not available (some TSOs are reluctant to provide the mentioned 
information) it can be stated that as general rule the compressor redundancy level is normally set at n+1, 
where n is the number of running compressors and “+1” denotes a standby unit. This leads to the following 
considerations: 
 If the number of compressors is greater than 3 the CS is considered to have Partial Redundancy  
 If the number of compressors is 2 two further scenarios arise: 
o Total redundancy (1 compressor running and 1 in standby) 
o Null redundancy (2 compressors running with no standby available) 
 If the number of compressors is 1 the CS has no redundancy.  
It should be noted that in case of partial redundancy the n running compressors do not normally handle 100% 
of their nominal/design flow and can thus provide a measure of further redundancy if required. For example, 
in a 9+1 configuration (where a single compressor is in stand-by) 8 running compressors can easily recover a 
potential lack of flow rate due the trip/failure of one unit by working closer to the stonewall point (as per 
Figure 5). 
Based on the considerations above, the following 8 different ECS (showing normal operational conditions) 
have been built, properly covering the overwhelming majority of the gas compressor stations in Europe: 
“N” denotes at least 3 machines, “TUCO” stands for turbocompressors, “MOCO” for motocompressors, “RP” 
means Partial Redundancy (e.g. 2 at 50%), “RN” means Null Redundancy and “RT” stands for Total 
Redundancy. The schematic diagrams of the 8 ECS are illustrated below and will be the main input data for 
the functional analysis and risk assessment to be discussed afterwards. “NO” denotes normally open valves, 
while “NC” denotes normally closed ones. 
Table 2 - Equivalent compressor stations 
Type Number of Compressors Type of Compressors Redundancy Level 
1 N TUCO RP 
2 N MOCO RP 
3 2 TUCO RN 
4 2 MOCO RN 
5 2 TUCO RT 
6 2 MOCO RT 
7 1 TUCO RN 
8 1 MOCO RN 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
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Figure 6 - Type 1 ECS: N-TUCO-RP 
 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
 
Figure 7 - Type 2 ECS: N-MOCO-RP 
 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
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Figure 8 - Type 3 ECS: 2-TUCO-RN 
 
Figure 9 - Type 4 ECS: 2-MOCO-RN 
 
Figure 10 - Type 5 ECS: 2-TUCO-RT 
 
Figure 11 - Type 6 ECS: 2-MOCO-RT 
 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
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Figure 12 - Type 7 ECS: 1-TUCO-RN 
 
Figure 13 - Type 8 ECS: 1-MOCO-RN 
 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
Given the non-trivial number of compressor stations with 3 compressors running and one in standby, two 
further ECS have been added to main 8 listed above as subsets of the N-TUCO and N-MOCO equivalent 
models: 
Table 3 - Particular models 
Type Number of Compressors Type of Compressors Redundancy Level 
1a 4 TUCO RP 
2a 4 MOCO RP 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
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Figure 14 - Type 1a ECS: 4-TUCO-RP 
 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
 
Figure 15 - Type 2a ECS: 4-MOCO-RP 
 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
 
It is worth mentioning that a small number of facilities in the EU are considerably larger in terms of the 
number of compressors and total installed power, such as Ommen in the Netherlands (16 compressors in 
total, split between high caloric and low caloric networks) or Baumgarten in Austria. It was however 
considered that these “complex” facilities do not need to be acknowledged specifically and analysed as 
additional categories, as explained above. The reliability/availability characteristics of this type of installation 
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do not depend on number and size of compressor units but again on their architectural configuration, i.e. 
ultimately on the redundancy level and spare part management philosophy of the facilities.  
Other facilities should also be mentioned given their importance: 
 Underground Gas Storage (UGS) Facilities - Natural gas can be stored in depleted reservoirs in oil 
and/or gas fields, in aquifers and in salt cavern formations. Gas is stored by means of gas 
compressors (generally intercooled multistage compressors) and is extracted through the sheer 
pressure difference. A UGS facility comprises three main sections: the underground gas reservoir, a 
gas treatment plant and a gas compression/injection station. Compressors used in UGS compressor 
stations are typically turbine-driven multistage centrifugal type (flow rates above 270.000 Sm3/h 
being normal values) with no standby units. In fact, although the required compression ratio is 
normally higher than in pipeline compressor stations (2 to 3 times), it is achievable by a single multi-
stage train, with no need of multiple compressors in series configuration. For this reason, the UGS 
compressor station can be assimilated to and modelled as a standard compressor station.  
 Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Terminals - In regasification terminals the LNG is stored and regasified 
for dispatch in pipelines. Terminals consist mainly of cryogenic atmospheric tanks in which LNG is 
stored at about –160 °C. LNG is first compressed by pumps submerged in the storage tanks (Low 
Pressure pumps); afterwards an additional compression stage (High Pressure pumps) is performed to 
reach the network pressure, the LNG is vaporized and brought at about 3-5°C to be sent to the 
pipeline. Usually a boil-off gas (BOG) compressor is installed in order to handle the BOG that is 
generated in the tanks during the loading phases. This compressor has not been considered in the 
equivalent model for this study, since it works intermittently (a few hours during a loading operation) 
and its operation does not directly affect the gas send out from the terminal. For this reason the BOG 
compressor normally has no spare (any maintenance activity can be easily carried out between two 
loadings). 
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3 Internal Security Risk Scenarios Identification and Characterization 
3.1 Scope and Methodology 
This section provides a detailed description of the implemented methodology, its application and obtained 
results. The objective of the present section is the identification and characterization of internal security risk 
scenarios. The present analysis is focused on successions of events leading to facility failures, the 
likelihood/probability of such scenarios, as well as the determination of flow and pressure effects and facility 
downtimes. The analysis is performed on the taxonomy of the most relevant compressor stations types 
identified previously, including for compression stations of UGS and LNG facilities.  
The procedural steps can be summarized as follows: 
 Functional Analysis, to identify a functional model (i.e. hierarchical structure) for the typical functions 
performed by compressor stations as a reference to define typical station/equipment failures; 
 Critical elements identification, to highlight the most relevant equipment failures contributing to gas 
compression disruption among those identified during functional analysis; 
 Damage Classes identification, to set the reference scenarios to be evaluated by a probabilistic 
assessment to characterize gas compressor station failures; 
 Component modelling, to collect data characterizing component failure modes in terms of failure and 
repair; 
 Fault Tree Analysis, to estimate the probability of occurrence of each Damage Class, for each typical 
configuration identified earlier. 
3.1.1 Functional Analysis 
A Functional Analysis is a procedure performed to identify the main functions of a system in order to provide 
a description (model) of the system itself according to its functions. The functional model has been set 
according to a hierarchical structure to split the most general functions into sub-functions in order to reach 
elementary functions performed by single equipment or small sets of components. A portion of the functional 
model is shown in Table 4. It has been applied to drive a HAZID (HAZard IDentification) session involving some 
experts in gas compression stations, in order to discuss the relevance of each function, operative problems, 
consequences in case of failures and typical approaches to malfunction recovery, resulting in a systematic 
mapping of functions and failures, with particular regard to operability and availability, typology, architectures 
and possible criticalities encountered in operation, as reported and discussed below. 
Table 4 - Functional Analysis Example. 
FUNCTION DESCRIPTION NOTES 
1 Gas entry in the station  
1.1 Pipelines coming in the station  
1.2 Entry pipeline pigging lines  
1.2.1 Venting of the traps  
2 Gas filtration/ separation  
2.1 Sending the line gas to filtering/separation  
2.2 Line gas filtration/ separation  
2.3 Sending the line gas to compression  
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
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3.1.2 Critical elements identification for Gas Compression Stations 
Among the thousands of components present in a typical gas compressor station, those most responsible for 
the unavailability of gas station operations must be identified. In order to have a quantitative ranking of the 
criticality of components and equipment installed in a generic Gas Compression Station, a complete and 
detailed availability study for an existing Gas Compression Station performed by RAMS&E in the past has 
been selected and analysed.  
This ranking is fundamental for the next steps of the analysis in order to focus on critical components in the 
probabilistic analysis, for each typical configuration presented above, thus avoiding a huge amount of work on 
components that do not contribute significantly to put the station out of service. By using this approach it was 
possible to quantitatively evaluate the relative influence of the various sub-components in the station 
unavailability and to put in evidence the most critical elements in a Gas Compression Station.  
An historical analysis, to highlight the causes and location of technical failures, has also been performed on 
the database provided by PHMSA (Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration Database – U.S. 
Department of Transportation) (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 2014). 
3.1.3 Damage Classes Identification 
The ultimate goal of the work presented here is to define a set of failure scenarios for typical EU gas 
compressor stations and the related probability of occurrence. Damage Classes represent the set of scenarios 
to be identified and analysed in this study. Each Damage Class is representative of a different degree of 
degradation of the service expected by gas compression station for the network.  
Starting from the taxonomy, and particularly the redundancy level of the different station types, the Damage 
Classes are identified and presented as the percentage of the nominal outlet flow available at the station in 
case of failure. No classes have been defined in terms of “output pressure reduction” since pressure and flow 
rate are directly connected by the load curve of the compressors/pumps; in addition it must be pointed out 
that the function of the station is to enable the mass transfer rather than the per se pressurization of the 
network. For these reasons, Damage Classes have been based on different grades of flow rate reduction. A 
confirmation of this point has been provided during the expert operators’ interview.  
All the compressors, for each compression station, have been considered equivalent (for typology, power and 
characteristics). The same approach has been used to analyse pumps present in Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) 
storage facilities. 
3.1.4 Components Modelling 
The various compression stations and the LNG facilities have been exploded in their components to be 
evaluated in terms of availability. Component characterisation must be performed setting two parameters for 
each failure mode affecting the component itself:  
 Failure Rate (FR), in (1/hours); 
 Mean Time to Repair (MTTR), in hours. 
For failure rate data, several databases have been considered (Chudoba, 2014) (EXIDA, 2008) (EXIDA, 2007) 
(Lees, 2005) (OREDA, 2009). Failure rates are almost independent of the power of the specific machinery 
(compressors/pumps), at least considering the power range usually applied in this kind of applications. Failure 
Rates have been assumed to be constant over time and mainly characterised by their mean values, and the 
probabilities of failures have been characterised by the use of a negative exponential distribution over time. 
No additional considerations about wear-in and wear-out impacts have been made, considering the 
equipment under study in the optimal reliability range of its lifetime, when failures can be considered 
characterized only on a random basis. The previous assumptions are normally applied during usual availability 
studies for complex installations. MTTR is the out of service time due to a failure and it must be set taking 
into account different contributions for this kind of installation: 
 Active Repair, the time necessary to repair or replace the component, plus a final functional test; 
 Technical Delay, the time required to prepare the machinery or system for maintenance (e.g. blow 
down, purging,…) and the time necessary to restore the operating conditions (e.g., the pressurization 
at the end of repair); 
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 Logistic Delay, the time necessary to provide spare parts (stocks), maintenance operators and special 
tools if necessary. 
Active repair times have been taken from (OREDA, 2009). Technical delay times have been assumed on the 
basis of engineering assumptions. 
In order to take into account different plant locations, the presence of available stocks, etc. three logistic 
delay times have been considered:  
 1 h logistic delay time (spare part present in plant warehouse); 
 24 h logistic delay time (spare part shortly available); 
 1 week logistic delay time (spare part not readily available). 
Calculations have been run with these different assumptions for logistic times in order to have results 
representative of plants equipped with spare parts or situated in easily reachable areas and plants in areas 
difficult to reach. For compression stations where dated or unusual machinery are present (e.g. of Soviet 
construction) it is generally standard to have spare parts in the warehouse at least for the most critical or 
hard to find on the market components. In the present analysis it is assumed that this condition is satisfied. 
Fault location and detection has been considered as negligible since all gas stations are locally manned. The 
format for the reliability data is illustrated in Table 5. 
Table 5 - Format for the reliability data. 
Component 
Failure 
Mode 
Failure 
Rate 
[1/h] 
Failure-
on-
Demand 
Probability 
Active 
Repair 
Time 
[h] 
Technical 
Delay 
Time [h] 
MTTR [h] 
Notes Reference 
Logistic Time 
1
h 
24
h 
168
h 
         
         
         
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
3.1.5 Fault Tree Analysis 
For each type of compression station and for the LNG facilities, the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) technique has 
been used to calculate the probability of the station to be in each specific Damage Class. FTA allows the 
calculation of a Top Event (system failures/damage class) probability as resulting by the combinations of 
elementary failures (components failure modes) and the related statistical data (FR and MTTR). For the Top 
Event two different estimations were performed:  
 Unavailability: the probability of out-of-service condition, expressed as the ratio between the system 
downtime due to failures and the overall theoretical time of operations (i.e., the operational time for 
an ideal failure-free system); 
 Unreliability: the probability of system failure before a given period of time, or alternatively the 
expected number of failures referred to a period of time. 
A fault tree example is presented in Figure 16. 
The output of this analysis is, for each configuration identified earlier and for all the defined Damage Classes 
(considering various logistic delay times), the probability that the facility is in the specified Damage Classes, 
and the frequency of these occurrences. In addition, criticality indexes for components are provided, i.e. the 
contribution of each component failure to the overall unavailability or unreliability of the entire station; this 
result allows identifying the weak points of the installations for each Damage Class and for each 
configuration. 
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Figure 16 - Fault Tree. 
 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
3.2 Functional Analysis 
3.2.1 Gas Compression Station 
In order to highlight the functions of the subsystems of a generic compressor station a Functional Analysis 
has been performed. This analysis splits the installation into its main functions, which are further decomposed 
into the elementary functions that constitute the main one. The functional model has been set according to 
hierarchical structure to split the most general functions into sub-functions to reach elementary functions 
performed by single equipment or small sets of components. A list of main functions and relative sub-
functions has been produced.  
The Functional Analysis has been used to facilitate the subsequent HAZID analysis, performed with the 
support of experts in gas compression stations in order to concentrate the analysis on systems actually 
representative of installations present in Europe. During the analysis the HAZID team added notes about the 
most commonly encountered architectures and specific operational problems of the various identified 
sections. Table 6 presents a summary of the considerations deriving from the HAZID process. 
Table 6 - Summary from HAZID session. 
FUNCTION  DESCRIPTION  NOTES  
1.  Gas entry in the station  
No particular issues for the availability of the 
compression station; at most there could be leakages 
from the pig trap 
1.1  Pipelines reaching the station    
1.2  Entry pipeline pigging lines    
1.2.1  Venting of the traps    
2.  Gas filtration/ separation  Gas sent to compressors undergoes separation 
2.1  
Sending the line gas to 
filtering/ separation  
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2.2  Line gas filtration/ separation  
For cartridge filters redundancy is always provided; these 
filters are usually substituted in about one hour. Cyclone 
separators require very little maintenance and generally 
do not give operative problems  
2.3  
Sending the line gas to 
compression  
  
3.  Compression of gas    
3.1  Compressors    
3.1.1  Power transmission    
3.1.2  Compressor unit    
3.1.3  Control and monitoring  
The control and monitoring system of the driver and of 
the compressor is generally integrated and can be 
restored in few hours (three hours is assumed). The 
compressors are tripped by low inlet pressure, high outlet 
temperature and high outlet pressure (and other causes 
such as vibrations, rotor position, lubricant oil pressure/ 
temperature, dry gas seal low pressure etc.) 
3.1.4  Lubrication system  
Lubrication pumps can be electrically driven or 
mechanically driven by the gas turbine/ compressor. 
Lubrication pumps are always provided with electrical 
spare pumps. If the gas turbine/compressor is equipped 
with mechanically driven lubrication pumps the spare 
electrical pump is used also during start-up and shut-
down transients during which the mechanically driven 
pump would not have the right speed to supply the 
correct oil flow to bearings 
3.1.5  Shaft seal system    
3.1.6  Miscellaneous    
3.2  Gas Turbine  
Gas turbines undergo main maintenance about every 
25’000 hours (down time about 1 month) and minor 
maintenance about every 10’000 hours (down time 
about 1 week) 
3.2.1  Starting system  The starting of a gas turbine can take about 20 minutes 
3.2.2  Gas generator    
3.2.3  Power turbine    
3.2.4  Control and monitoring  
The control and monitoring systems of the driver and of 
the compressor is generally integrated and can be 
restored in few hours (three hours is assumed) 
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3.2.5  Lubrication system  
Lubrication pumps can be electrically driven or 
mechanically driven by the gas turbine/ compressor. 
Lubrication pumps are always provided with electrical 
spare pumps. If the gas turbine/compressor is equipped 
with mechanically driven lubrication pumps the spare 
electrical pump is used also during start-up and shut-
down transients during which the mechanically driven 
pump would not have the right speed to guarantee the 
correct oil flow to bearings 
3.2.6  Miscellaneous    
3.3  Electrical motor    
3.3.1  Control and monitoring  
The control and monitoring systems of the driver and of 
the compressor is generally integrated and can be 
restored in few hours (three hours is assumed) 
3.3.2  Cooling system    
3.3.3  Electric motor  
The electric motors maintenance is usually scheduled to 
be performed every 3 years (26’280 hours) and involves 
a downtime equal to 14 days (336 hours)  
3.3.4  Lubrication system    
3.3.5  Miscellaneous    
3.4  Cooling the compressed gas  
Compressed gas could be cooled in air coolers (cooling 
requirement depends on pipeline temperature design). 
The principal deviation for these systems is the fan 
electric motor failure (these motors can be substituted in 
about one hour) 
3.4.1  Heat exchanger    
3.4.2  Air cooler    
3.4.2.1  Fans    
4.  
Sending the gas from the 
station  
No particular issues for availability of compression 
station; at most there could be leakages from the pig 
trap 
4.1  Exit pipelines pigging lines    
4.1.2  Venting of the traps    
4.2  
Departure of pipeline from 
station  
  
5.  Auxiliary services    
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5.1  Main power supply  
Electricity is transformed into “low voltage” in the 
compression station  
5.2  Emergency power supply  
Both emergency generators (generally diesel engine 
driven) and batteries are usually present  
5.2.1  
Emergency generator storage 
fluids  
  
5.3  Supply fuel gas to users  
Fuel gas to users is obtained by reducing the pressure of 
line gas 
5.3.1  Pressure Reduction  
The fuel gas for turbo gas turbines pressure could be 
reduced and temperature raised before the combustion 
chamber. The fuel gas heating is performed in a heat 
exchanger via hot water from a dedicated boiler  
5.3.2  
Sending the fuel gas to Turbo 
gas  
In case of gas spilled from the line to be used as fuel 
gas in gas turbines cartridge filters are always present in 
order to avoid plugging of burner orifices 
5.3.3  
Sending the fuel gas to the 
auxiliary boiler  
Fuel gas for boiler burners is heated, before pressure 
reduction, by an electric heater  
5.4  Compressed air  
Compressed air can be used to actuate smaller valves 
(e.g. control valves) 
5.4.1  Air supply    
5.4.2  Air dehumidification    
5.4.3  Filtering    
5.4.4  Air compression  
Air, to actuate valves, is compressed to about 14 barg 
pressure; 2 compressors are present (one compressor 
spare)  
5.4.5  Storage  
A buffer (allowing valves operations with air 
compressors not available) is present 
5.4.5.1  Main storage of compressed air    
5.4.6 Compressed air distribution    
5.5 
Heating water to the users of 
the station  
2 boilers (one boiler spare) are used to pre-heat fuel gas 
for turbo gas turbines (before pressure reduction); one 
additional boiler is for general use (buildings, sanitary) 
5.5.1 Gas supply via dedicated line    
5.5.2  Heat generation    
5.5.3 Heating sanitary water    
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6. Safety Services  
Gas compression stations are equipped with fire and gas 
sensors that shut down the station. The station is divided 
in isolatable sections that can be separately vented. The 
isolatable section including the compressor is about 45 
m at 75 barg; sometimes a buffer volume to discharge 
the gas is present, the gas stored here in case of 
emergency can be reintroduced in the line by a 
reciprocating compressor 
6.1 
Protection against internal 
events  
  
6.1.1 Containment basins    
6.1.2 Fire detection system  Fire detectors activate station shutdown 
6.1.2.1 
Firefighting system with water 
of the station  
  
6.1.2.1.1 Firefighting water distribution    
6.1.2.1.1.1 
Lines of firefighting water 
distribution  
  
6.1.2.1.1.2 Hydrants    
6.1.2.2  
Firefighting system with slaved 
CO2 to vent machines.  
  
6.1.2.2.1 CO2 storage    
6.1.2.2.2 CO2 distribution    
6.1.2.3 Firefighting with water    
6.1.2.3.1 Water storage    
6.1.2.3.2 Distribution of water    
6.1.3 Portable fire extinguishers    
6.1.4 
Fire detection: smoke, heat etc. 
detectors  
  
6.1.5 Alarm System    
6.1.6 Distributed control with DCS    
6.1.7 Gas detection  Gas detectors activate station shutdown 
6.2  Protection from external events    
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6.2.1  Flood protection    
6.2.2  Protection against earthquakes    
6.2.3  
Protection from external 
projectiles 
  
6.2.4  Protection from tornadoes    
6.2.5  Protection from lightning  
Gas stations are not generally provided with lightning 
conductors as they are auto-protected; a grounding 
system is provided  
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
 
Other general results obtained during HAZID were obtained:  
 Generally, interruption of compression functionality for few hours (up to 4 hours) is not critical for 
the gas network due to the line pack, i.e. the pressurized gas present in piping. The network is 
pressurized between 55 and 75 barg, the flow velocity is about 8 – 15 m/s during normal operations 
and 2 – 3 m/s during pigging of the lines. 
 Due to efficiency reasons compressors generally work in the upper part of their working range. It has 
been pointed out that if the compression group (driver, compressor and relative accessories) works 
properly it can ensure the nominal pressure of the network, the latter as a whole defining the 
pressure. 
 Natural gas flowing in gas pipelines, due to his low hydrogen sulphide content, is not chemically 
aggressive for steel; corrosion allowance is not used. 
 Valves can be actuated by “gas over oil” (pressure of the line gas is reduced to about 45 barg) or, for 
smaller valves (e.g. control valves), by compressed air (about 14 barg pressure). In case of 
“electrohydraulic” valves, 3 strokes of valves are guaranteed in case of circuit low pressure. 
The architecture of compression stations for UGS is not dissimilar from that used for line compressor stations, 
enabling the extension to UGS facilities of considerations done for these installations. It is also possible to 
identify the systems that constitute LNG installations: tanks, LP pumps, HP pumps and vaporizers. Pumps are 
typically driven by electric motors. It is therefore possible to study the unavailability of these subsystems and 
its contribution to the unavailability of the whole system. 
3.3 Critical element identification for Gas Compression Stations 
3.3.1 Availability study applied to an existing gas compression station 
In order to have a quantitative ranking of the criticality of sub-units present in a generic compressor station, a 
previously performed complete availability study applied to a compressor station representative of a generic 
installation has been analysed. It is therefore possible to evaluate the contribution of the main subsystems 
and components to the unavailability of the station. The selected compression station is composed of four 
turbo compressors driven by gas turbines (3 operating and one spare).  
Before being sent to compressors, gas coming from the compression station inlet pipeline passes through a 
separation section (Inlet Metering Separator), through a Metering Station composed of three lines (3 x 50%), 
each equipped with a ultrasonic flow sensor, and through another separator (Compressor Suction Scrubber); 
the liquid phase collected in the two separators is sent to a Cyclone Separator and stored in a Condensate 
Tank. Most of the gaseous phase is sent to compressors, a small fraction being sent to the fuel gas system. 
Fuel gas is designed to feed the turbines of compressors and the emergency power generation. After 
compression, gas is cooled in Air Coolers (4 bays, 3 operating and 1 spare, each one with 2 fans). The 
functional scheme of the above described compression station is illustrated in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17 - Functional schematic of generic compressor station. 
 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
 
The study performed to calculate the availability of the aforementioned compressor station demonstrated 
that (neglecting inferior order contributions) the contribution of the subsystems to the station unavailability is 
mainly due to turbo compressors (74%), Process Control System and Service Air System contribute at 9% 
each, the Gas Cooling System has a contribution of 5% and the Separation System contributes for 3% (mainly 
due to malfunction of high level switches on condensate separators and condensate tank). Figure 18 
illustrates the relative criticality of the main subsystems of a Gas Compression station. 
Figure 18 - Criticality of main subsystems. 
 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
 
From the results of this analysis it is evident that compressors give the main contribution to the unavailability 
of the gas station; it is important to include in the failure of compressors and their drivers, since the process 
control system has a non-negligible contribution. The effect of “Service air failure” has a significant 
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contribution. The Gas Cooling System has a lower contribution to gas station unavailability; HAZID analysis 
evidenced that this system is not always present and, if present, gas cooling is performed by air coolers. The 
influence of the separation system is minor; in the plant considered in the availability study, the level switches 
present on the condensate tank and on the condensate separator activate plant shut down. The spurious 
intervention of these sensors gives a non-negligible contribution to system unavailability. 
3.3.2 Historical Investigation 
Relevant information about gas transportation facilities is present in the database created by PHMSA (Pipeline 
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 2014), which requires pipeline operators to submit reports for 
incidents following the directives issued by Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (49 CFR Parts 191, 
195), published in the Federal Register by the executive departments and agencies of the federal government 
of the United States (United States Department of Transportation, 2014). The aforementioned database 
includes reported incidents that meet the sequent definitions (see Regulation 49 part 191.3):  
“Incident means any of the following events:  
 (1) An event that involves a release of gas from a pipeline, or of liquefied natural gas, liquefied 
petroleum gas, refrigerant gas, or gas from an LNG facility, and that results in one or more of the following 
consequences: (i) A death, or personal injury necessitating in-patient hospitalization; (ii) Estimated property 
damage of $50,000 or more, including loss to the operator and others, or both, but excluding cost of gas lost; 
(iii) Unintentional estimated gas loss of three million cubic feet or more; 
 (2) An event that results in an emergency shutdown of an LNG facility. Activation of an emergency 
shutdown system for reasons other than an actual emergency does not constitute an incident. 
 (3) An event that is significant in the judgment of the operator, even though it did not meet the 
criteria of paragraphs (1) or (2) of this definition.” 
From the conditions reported above it is evident that the database contains only major accidents. From this 
database, reports of accidents that occurred in compressor stations in the period 1986 – September 2014 
have been selected. Figure 19 illustrates the different causes of failures of a gas compression stations.  
Accidents due to technical causes or human errors (184 accidents) have been taken into consideration.  
About 50% of accidents is due to Mechanical Failures: in 27% of cases it is expressly reported that the failure 
occurred at the compressor or at the turbine; in 16% of cases the fault location is specified in piping (fittings,  
gaskets, flanges, valves etc.); in 6% of cases the fault location is not indicated or it is different from the 
others above cited. Another important cause of failure is the malfunction of controls or ESD systems, 
responsible for 27% of the failures (generally ESD spurious intervention). The lubricant oil system caused 7% 
of failures (generally leakage of oil that caught fire). Corrosion was responsible for 5% of failures. Loss of 
power, loss of electric power and emergency generators or batteries failure on demand, caused 2% of failures 
of gas compression stations. Human errors (errors during maintenance, vehicle collision, improper operation, 
etc.) contributed for 10% of total cases of failure of gas compression stations. 
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Figure 19 - Causes of failure in compressor stations. 
 
Source: PHMSA, 2014. 
Some reports indicate a shut down time due to various accidents, such data being available only for recently 
issued reports (2010–2014). Table 7 illustrates mean downtimes for various causes, 29 accidents having 
been considered: 
Table 7 - Shutdown time by accident cause. 
Cause Mean Downtime h 
Mechanical, Compressor/ Turbine 206 
Malfunction, ESD/ Control System 28 
Mechanical, Piping 46 
Human 80 
Lubricant oil system 40 
Corrosion 220 
Loss of power 2 
Source: PHMSA, 2014. 
 
A detailed historical analysis is presented later in the present document in order to put in evidence the 
influence of natural phenomena on accidents involving gas compression facilities. 
3.4 Damage Classes 
The compressor station taxonomy presented above was analysed to identify the relevant Damage Classes 
that are possible for these installations and that are liable to affect the operation of the transportation 
network. Such an identification of is based on the following considerations: 
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 Eight typical configurations have been identified for compressor stations (also representative of UGS 
facilities) and are characterized by different redundancy levels; for each configuration, all 
compressors have been considered identical in power and characteristics. Such typical configurations 
can also be used as building blocks for the description of more complex stations as a series or 
parallel arrangement of such different configurations. 
 Regarding LNG facilities a dedicated typical configuration has been identified; from its architecture 
and redundancy it is possible to identify Damage Classes as reduction of LNG flow due to pump (or 
its driver or accessories) failure, or to cryogenic tank leakage or to vaporizer failure.  
 Analogously to compressor stations, in the case of LNG facilities all pumps of each type (Low 
Pressure and High Pressure) have been considered equivalent in power and characteristics; storage 
tanks and vaporizers have also been considered equivalent among them. 
Damage Classes have been defined in terms of flow rate reduction only, without considering the reduction of 
the output pressure, since the function of the stations is to enable mass transfer rather than providing per se 
network pressurisation. 
3.4.1 Gas Compression Stations/ UGS Facilities 
Damage Classes have been set for gas compression stations and UGS facilities:  
 The 0% flow damage class represent a scenario in which the compressors stops and the bypass 
valve fails to open, resulting in a total absence of gas flow through the station. This class takes place 
when the compressors and the valve that opens the bypass all fail simultaneously. 
 The 33, 50 and 66% flow damage classes (nominal pressure) are the scenario in which each 
percentage of the nominal flow is delivered. 
 The “Bypass” damage class is the case of the compression station completely bypassed without 
performing compression (the pressure having essentially its value upstream of the station), without 
flow interruption. The occurrence of this class needs the concurrent failure of all the compressors but 
the correct functioning of the bypass valve. This class is of course not relevant for UGS facilities. 
The flow rate reduction refers to the “nominal” flow rate expected by each typical configuration, according to 
network pressure. In configurations with 3 compressors, 2 compressors running and 1 compressor spare 
(configurations 1 and 2) the 33% and 66% flow damage classes are not applicable. In configurations with 4 
compressors, 3 compressors running and 1 compressor spare (configurations 1a and 2a) the 50% flow 
damage class is not applicable. In configurations s with 2 compressors both running, no spare (configurations 
3 and 4) the 33% and 66% flow damage classes are not applicable. In configurations with 2 compressors, 
one spare (configurations 5 and 6) the 33%, 50% and 66% flow damage classes are not applicable (one 
compressor running ensures the nominal flow). In configurations with 1 compressor and no spare 
(configurations 7 and 8) the 33%, 50% and 66% flow damage classes are not applicable (the only 
compressor ensures the nominal flow). In Table 8, for each typical architecture, the applicable Damage 
Classes have been marked. These classes are also applicable to Underground Gas Storage (UGS) Compression 
Stations. 
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Table 8 - Damage classes for compressor stations/ UGS facilities. 
Configuration Sketch 
Damage Class 
0% 
Flow 
33% 
Flow 
50% 
Flow 
66% 
Flow 
Bypass 
N-TUCO-R (3 
compressors 
gas turbine 
driven, 1 
spare) 
 
X  X  X 
4-TUCO-RP (4 
compressors 
gas turbine 
driven, 1 
spare) 
 
X X  X X 
N-MOCO-RP    
(3 compressors 
electric motor 
driven, 1 
spare) 
 
X  X  X 
4-MOCO-RP    
(4 compressors 
electric motor 
driven, 1 
spare) 
 
X X  X X 
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2-TUCO-RN     
(2 compressors 
gas turbine 
driven, no 
spare) 
 
X  X  X 
2-MOCO-RN    
(2 compressors 
electric motor 
driven, no 
spare) 
 
X  X  X 
2-TUCO-RT     
(2 compressors 
gas turbine 
driven, 1 
spare) 
 
X    X 
2-MOCO-RT    
(2 compressors 
electric motor 
driven, 1 
spare) 
 
X    X 
1-TUCO-RN     
(1 compressor 
gas turbine 
driven, no 
spare)  
X    X 
8-1-MOCO-RN 
(1 compressor 
electric motor 
driven, no 
spare  
X    X 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
3.4.2 LNG Facilities 
The selected typical configuration for the LNG Terminals is illustrated in Figure 20. 
TK1-4 are the LNG storage tanks, P1-4 are the Low Pressure pumps, submerged in tanks 1-4 (3 pumps are 
operative, one pump in standby), P5-7 are the High Pressure pumps (two pumps are operative, one pump in 
standby), V1-3 are the vaporizers in which the regasification process takes place. In the typical analyses in the 
present study all pumps are driven by electric motors. In this case, considering the level of redundancy, four 
Damage Classes were identified at 66, 50, 33 and 0% of the nominal flow. The “Bypass” damage class is not 
relevant for LNG facilities. 
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Figure 20 - LNG Terminal schematic. 
 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
 
3.5 Components Modelling 
The various compressor stations and the LNG facilities have been decomposed into their components to be 
evaluated in terms of reliability and production availability, in order to estimate how component failures 
contribute to the time spent by the system in each Damage Class along the year (system production 
unavailability - Q) and the number of transitions from the normal operation to each Damage Class (system 
unreliability or Expected Number of Failures - ENF).  
Component characterisation must be performed setting two parameters for each failure mode affecting the 
component itself:  
 Failure Rate (FR) – [1/h]; 
 Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) – [h]. 
Failure Rates have been assumed to be constant over time and mainly characterised by their mean value, and 
the probabilities of failures have been characterised by the use of a negative exponential distribution over 
time.  
No additional considerations about wear-in and wear-out impact have been done, considering the equipment 
under study in the reliability optimal range of its lifetime when failures can be considered characterized only 
on a random basis.  
MTTR is the out of service time due to a failure and it must be set taking into account for different 
contributions, for this kind of installations:  
 Active Repair, the time necessary to repair the component or for its substitution and a final functional 
test; 
 Technical Delay, the time required to prepare the machinery or system for maintenance (e.g. blow 
down, purging, ...) and the time necessary to restore the operating conditions (e.g. pressurization at 
the end of repair); 
 Logistic Delay, the time necessary to provide spare parts, maintenance operators and special tools if 
necessary. 
Active repair times have been mainly taken from (OREDA, 2009).  
Technical delay time has been assumed as: 
 8 h for components in contact with Methane; 
 2 h for components not in contact with Methane; 
 48 h for LNG submerged pumps; 
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 72 h for LNG tanks; 
 2 h in case of spurious valve operation (considered as actuator failures). 
In order to take into account different plant locations, the presence of available stocks, the availability of the 
maintenance team and tools, all the calculations have been made using three different logistic delay times: 
 1 h logistic delay time (spare part present in plant warehouse); 
 24 h logistic delay time (spare part shortly available); 
 1 week logistic delay time (spare part not readily available). 
Calculations have been run with these different assumptions for logistic times in order to have results 
representative of plants equipped with spare parts, situated in easily reachable areas or in remote/hard to 
reach areas.  
Fault location and detection has been considered as negligible since all gas stations are locally manned. 
Preventive maintenance has been evaluated by considering typical indications from manufacturers and 
interviews with experts: electrically driven compressors were considered undergo total overhauls every 26280 
h with downtimes of 336 h, while gas turbines were considered to be maintained every 25000 h with 
downtimes of 720 h, besides minor maintenances every 10000 h with downtimes of 168 h.  
The influence of preventive maintenance has been taken into account as an additional contribution to 
unavailability estimated as the rate between the downtime for maintenance and the time interval between 
maintenances. Preventive maintenance does not affect the unreliability of components since the failure rates 
used to characterise component failure modes refer to machinery subjected to a typical preventive 
maintenance cycle similar to the one hypothesized above. The unavailability due to preventive maintenance 
downtime has been considered in failure trees as an additional event. 
Preliminary analyses show the relevant contribution of compressors to the whole system unavailability. For 
this reason both they and their drivers have been characterised considering critical failures that also take into 
account lubrication, control and monitoring systems or shaft seal systems (for compressors).  
Regarding LNG storage facilities, data for equipment dedicated to this specific application, in particular 
pumps, valves, tanks and vaporisers, has been considered. Failure rates for LNG pumps are available but 
typically as data relative to “Major Failure”, “Minor Failure” and “Safety Related Failure” (Lees, 2005) rather 
than split by failure mode.  
Conservative availability and reliability estimations led to two different failure modes being considered (“fail 
while running” and “fail to start”), the difference between the two scenarios being the repair time.  
The following failure modes have been considered for the various components:  
 Air cooler: leakage; fan failure (electric motor spurious stop); 
 Compressor: critical failure (active compressor); failure on demand (standby component); 
 Electrical motor: critical failure (active component); failure on demand (standby components); 
 Filter: blockage; 
 Gas turbine: critical failure (active component); failure on demand (standby component); 
 LNG Pump: major failure (active component); failure on demand (standby component); 
 LNG Tank: cold spot; 
 LNG Valve: failure (both active and stand by components); spurious operation (motorised valves); 
 Valve: external leakage; fail to operate; spurious operation (motorised valves).  
Failure Rates and repair data used in this study are illustrated In Table 9. 
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Table 9 - Failure rates. 
Component 
Failure 
Mode 
Failure 
Rate 
[1/h] 
Active 
Repair 
Time [h] 
Technical 
Delay Time 
[h] 
MTTR [h] 
Notes Reference Logistic Time 
1h 24h 168h 
Air cooler Leakage 
7,50E-
5 
12 8 21 44 188  
Lees 3rd 
Ed. 
Air cooler 
Fan 
Failure 
4,32E-
6 
1 2 4 27 171 
Electric 
motor 
spurious 
stop 
OREDA 
2009 
Compressor 
Critical 
failure 
7.60E-
5 
49 8 58 81 225  
OREDA 
2009 
Compressor 
Fails to 
start 
2,59E-
5 
27 8 36 59 203 
1 year test 
interval 
considered 
OREDA 
2009 
Electrically 
driven 
compressor 
Critical 
failure 
6,72E-
5 
12 2 15 38 182  
OREDA 
2009 
Electrically 
driven 
compressor 
Fails to 
start 
9,13E-
6 
11 2 14 37 181 
1 year test 
interval 
considered 
OREDA 
2009 
Electrically 
driven pump 
Critical 
failure 
1,25E-
5 
14 2 17 40 184  
OREDA 
2009 
Electrically 
driven pump 
Fails to 
start 
4,17E-
6 
4 2 7 30 174 
1 year test 
interval 
considered 
OREDA 
2009 
Filter Blockage 1 E-6 1 8 10 33 177  
Lees 3rd 
Ed. 
Gas turbine 
Critical 
failure 
3,42E-
4 
26 2 29 52 196  
OREDA 
2009 
Gas turbine 
Fails to 
start 
1,06E-
4 
26 2 29 52 196  
OREDA 
2009 
LNG pump 
Major 
failure 
2,86E-
5 
18 48 67 90 234 
Active 
repair time 
from 
OREDA 
2009 
Lees 3rd 
Ed. 
LNG pump 
Fails to 
start 
2,86E-
5 
8 48 57 80 224 
Active 
repair time 
from 
OREDA 
Lees 3rd 
Ed. 
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2009 
LNG tank Cold spot 
1,00E-
5 
168 72 241 264 408 
Active 
repair time 
estimated 
at one 
week 
Lees 3rd 
Ed. 
LNG valve Failure 
5,00E-
8 
6 8 15 38 182 
Active 
repair time 
from 
OREDA 
2009 
Lees 3rd 
Ed. 
LNG valve 
Spurious 
operation 
8,00E-
8 
6 2 9 32 176  
OREDA 
2009 
LNG 
vaporizer 
Major 
failure 
1,25E-
4 
4 8 13 36 180 
Active 
repair time 
from 
OREDA 
2009 
(heat 
exchanger) 
Lees 3rd 
Ed. 
Valve 
External 
leakage 
3,60E-
7 
32 8 41 62 208  
OREDA 
2009 
Valve 
Fails to 
operate 
1,00E-
6 
5 8 14 37 181 
1 year test 
interval 
considered 
OREDA 
2009 
Valve 
Spurious 
operation 
8,00E-
8 
6 2 9 32 176  
OREDA 
2009 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
3.6 Fault Tree Analysis 
The various architectures representative of gas compressor stations, UGS and LNG Facilities were analysed 
using a fault tree analysis technique for the different Damage Classes mentioned above and taking into 
account different Logistic Delay Times (1 h, spare part present in plant warehouse; 24 h, spare part shortly 
available; 1 week spare part not readily available).  
3.6.1 System modelling by Fault trees  
Fault trees have been analysed using the STARS Studio (Version 0.9 December 99) software. Two calculation 
runs have been performed to evaluate the effects of Corrective and Preventive Maintenance. For 
configurations where spare machinery is available, the following hypothesis have been made: 
 In case of failure of a machine, the lost flow rate is guaranteed by the spare (i.e. the lost flow rate 
cannot be provided by increasing the power of the running machines);  
 Preventive Maintenance is performed when the machinery is in standby, without stopping operations. 
The mission time has been considered of one year. It has been assumed that compression stations are 
equipped with batteries of filters and air coolers; these batteries are common to all compressors present in 
the station, respectively at the suction and at the discharge of compressors. It has been assumed that 2 air 
coolers and 2 filters are installed for each active compressor, plus an additional air cooler and an additional 
filter. Moreover, it has been assumed that each compressor needs two air coolers and two filters to run 
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properly. Three valves for compressor, 2 valves for each filter and other 8 main valves in the compression 
station have been considered.  
In the case of the “Bypass” and “0% flow” damage classes, the influence of Common Cause Failures (CCF) has 
been taken into account. CCF gives the possibility to take into account single events that are able to 
compromise the effectiveness of redundant systems due to external impacts, maintenance errors, and of 
equipment manufacturing defects. The calculation of CCF is particularly relevant for components set in 
parallel, i.e., filters, air coolers, compressors and their drivers.  
The CCF contribution has been set equal to the 2% of the component failure rate according to the assumption 
usually made for these types of situations.  
Natural causes have not been included in the CCF contribution since they have been considered separately 
later on.  
Figures 21-23 provide an example of application of the fault tree analysis to configuration N-TUCO-RP, for 
the various Damage Classes, taking into account the contribution of both corrective and preventive 
maintenance. 
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Figure 21 - N-TUCO-RP; 50% Flow Damage Class; Corrective + Preventive Maintenance – Fault Tree. 
 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
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Figure 22 - N-TUCO-RP; “Bypass” Damage Class; Corrective + Preventive Maintenance – Fault Tree. 
 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
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Figure 23 - N-TUCO-RP; 0% Flow Damage Class; Corrective + Preventive Maintenance – Fault Tree. 
 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
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Note that the partial results containing corrective maintenance only do not make sense in practice since the 
failure rates used for component modelling are derived by statistics on real components managed by 
preventive maintenance policies. The developed fault trees are listed in Table 10. 
Table 10 - List of developed fault trees. 
Configuration Damage Class 
1: N-TUCO-RP 
50% Flow 
Bypass 
0% Flow 
1a: 4-TUCO-RP 
66% Flow 
33% Flow 
Bypass 
0% Flow 
2: N-MOCO-RP 
50% Flow 
Bypass 
0% Flow 
2a: 4-TUCO-RP 
66% Flow 
33% Flow 
Bypass 
0% Flow 
3: 2-TUCO-RN 
50% Flow 
Bypass 
0% Flow 
4: 2-MOCO-RN 
50% Flow 
Bypass 
0% Flow 
5: 2-TUCO-RT 
Bypass 
0% Flow 
6: 2-MOCO-RT 
Bypass 
0% Flow 
7: 1-TUCO-RN Bypass 
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0% Flow 
8: 1-MOCO-RN 
Bypass 
0% Flow 
LNG 
66% Flow 
50% Flow 
33% Flow 
0% Flow 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
3.6.2 Reliability Analysis 
This section provides a description of the obtained results. The calculations performed do not consider the 
influence of natural hazards that are expressly evaluated later on. 
The results related to configuration N-TUCO-RP (Table 11) are taken into consideration here below to discuss 
their interpretation. Typical results from Fault Tree Analysis are:  
 Unavalilability (Q): the probability for the system to be in the considered damage class, i.e. the 
fraction of time spent by the system in the considered damage class; 
 Expected Number of Failures (ENF): the mean number of failures (leading to the considered damage 
class) expected in one year; 
 Downtime: the cumulative time in a year in which the system is in the considered Damage Class; 
 Average Downtime: the mean down time of the system for a failure leading to the considered 
Damage Class, i.e. the average time that is necessary to recover from the failure and get out from 
the considered Damage Class. 
Unavailability decreases as the damage class severity increases (50% nominal flow, “bypass”, 0% flow) and 
increases as Logistic Delay Time increases. 
Table 11 shows that in case of class “50% Nominal Flow” and considering the presence on site of spare parts 
and operators (Logistic Delay 1 hr) the unavailability is 2.08E-2 (Corrective + Preventive Maintenance); These 
values increase in case stocks are not on site, arriving to 9.69% and 11.6% in the worst logistic conditions 
case. This unavailability is produced by an average number of failures that is in the order of 4 – 6 failures per 
year.  
The increase of Logistic Delay slightly increases the number of station failures, since in case of failure of the 
working machinery, the availability of the redundant component is reduced. 
Table 11 - 1-N-TUCO-RP, Unavailability (Q), Expected Number of Failures (ENF), Downtime [h/year], Average Down Time 
[h]. 
Configuration Damage Class Parameter 
Corrective + Corrective Maintenance 
Logistic Delay Time 
1 h 24 h 168 h 
1: N-TUCO-RP 
50% nominal 
flow 
Q 2,08E-02 3,46E-02 1,16E-01 
ENF [occ/year] 4,98E+00 5,07E+00 5,62E+00 
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Downtime 
[h/year] 
1,82E+02 3,03E+02 1,02E+03 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
3,65E+01 5,96E+01 1,81E+02 
Bypass 
Q 7,37E-04 1,39E-03 8,06E-03 
ENF [occ/year] 2,19E-01 2,65E-01 5,45E-01 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
6,46E+00 1,22E+01 7,06E+01 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
2,95E+01 4,59E+01 1,30E+02 
0% nominal 
flow 
Q 3,41E-06 6,58E-06 4,09E-05 
ENF [occ/year] 1,05E-03 1,31E-03 2,90E-03 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
2,98E-02 5,76E-02 3,59E-01 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
2,84E+01 4,39E+01 1,24E+02 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
In case of “bypass” Damage Class (all compressors failed and opening of the station bypass valve) and 
considering the presence on site of spare parts and operators (Logistic Delay 1 hr) the unavailability is 7.37E-
4 (Corrective + Preventive Maintenance); this result is mainly due to the contribution of failures and repair 
since the Preventive Maintenance can be performed on the spare machine, when out of service, without 
relevant contributions on system operations.  
These values increase in case stocks are not on site, arriving to 0.806% under the worst logistic conditions. 
This unavailability is produced by an average number of failures that is in the order of 2–6 failures every 10 
years.  
The unavailability and the expected number of failures are lower in case of “bypass” Damage Class than for 
“50% nominal flow” class, because the “bypass” class is often reached after a higher number of failures occur 
contemporaneously.  
The increase of Logistic Delay results in an increase the number of station failures, since the period of 
operation without any redundancy is longer. The number of expected failures increases in proportion more in 
case of “bypass” class than in case of “50% nominal flow” class, due to the fact that the “bypass” class is 
often induced by the failure of more components.  
In case of 0% flow Damage Class (all compressors failed and station by-pass valve failed on demand) and 
considering the presence on site of spare parts and operators (Logistic Delay 1 hr), the unavailability is 3.41E-
6 (Corrective + Preventive Maintenance); The contribution of Preventive Maintenance is very low since the 
most part of unavailability is due to failures and repair operations. These values increase in case stocks are 
not on site, arriving to 0.00409% in the worst logistic conditions case. This unavailability is produced by an 
average number of failures that is in the order of 1–3 failures every 1000 years.  
The unavailability and the expected number of failures are lower in case of “0% flow” class than for the other 
classes because a higher number of failures compared to the other classes has to occur contemporaneously, 
or because the failures leading to this status are quite rare.  
As in the other Damage Classes, an increase of Logistic Delay Time leads to an increase of the expected 
number of failures in one year, as discussed above. The relative influence of logistic delay in this case is 
higher than in the others. The reason is that, in case of failure of working machinery, the period of operation 
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without any redundancy is increased and as a consequence of that the probability to fall in the “0% flow” 
condition increases; the “0% flow” class is more sensitive to this parameter than the other classes due to the 
higher number of contemporaneous failures needed.  
Regarding downtimes, it should be noted that the values do not change greatly since they represent the time 
necessary to recover from the Damage Class. In fact, a lot of simultaneous failures are necessary to fall in 
the worst Damage Classes and, according to the needs of Fault Tree Analysis, the repair activities of different 
items are considered as independent. This situation leads to the unavailability of the station during the 
"overlapping" of parallel repair activities that are normally shorter than the duration of the repair of the single 
failures. For this reason the down time does not increase in the worst Damage Classes and in some cases it 
could be shorter.  
3.6.3 Criticality  
The importance of the single components, in terms of contribution to the total system unavailability, has been 
evaluated. The Fussell–Vesely (FV) parameter has been adopted; it is an estimation of the contribution of the 
unavailability of each failure mode on the overall gas station unavailability.  
As an example, the Fussell–Vesely importance indexes have been reported for N-TUCO-RP in Table 12, 
considering the different Damage Classes and Logistic Delay Times and taking into account Corrective and 
Preventive Maintenance. Components are ordered by decreasing FV Importance. In the same Table the 
unavailability of the single components is also reported. In this table, for components logically set in series 
(e.g. leakage of valves), the unavailability and the FV Importance have been calculated for the single 
component, in order to make it easier to perform a comparison independently of the number of components 
present in the compression station.  
As expected, the most critical elements are the gas compression station machines (compressors and Gas 
Turbines) whereas air coolers and filters have minor or negligible importance. Components with the highest FV 
importance are the components that contribute most largely to the system unavailability and therefore that 
deserve attention in terms of design, operation & maintenance activities and monitoring.  
The 50% nominal flow Damage Class, with 1 hr Logistic Delay Time, shows that in this case the FV 
importance of Gas Turbines and Compressors is more than two orders of magnitude larger than that of the 
other components. This result highlights the importance of machines in gas compression stations, related to 
failure rates and repair time of these complex components but also to the architecture of gas compression 
stations. The increase of Logistic Delay Time increases the unavailability of the various components but it 
does not influence significantly the FV importance.  
In case of “bypass” and “0% flow” Damage Classes, the CCF (Common Cause Failure) has also been 
considered. In these Damage Classes the influence of common cause failures affecting the whole compressor, 
driver and compressor related valves, has shown a preeminent importance. Only in case of the longest 
considered Logistic Delay Times (168 hr), CCF related to machinery are exceeded in importance by the failure 
of gas turbines, both active and spare. This result evidences the importance of common causes for critical 
components and confirms the criticality of turbines and compressors that, like in case of the 50% nominal 
flow Damage Class, are the most critical items.  
A relatively high importance for “bypass” and “0% flow” Damage Classes is also shown by valves leak, and air 
coolers CCF. In case of “0% flow” Damage Class the most important component is the station by- pass valve 
(fail to open on demand); this damage class is reached if all the compressor present in the compression 
station are failed and the by-pass valve fails to open; in other words, if the by-pass valve works properly the 
0% flow damage class is never reached. The influence of Logistic Delay Time on FV Importance is not 
particularly significant for high Importance components whereas it is strong on low Importance components. 
Table 12 - Criticality: 1-N-TUCO-RP with Corrective + Preventive Maintenance. 
Configuration 
Damage 
Class 
Logistic Delay 
Time [h] 
Component Unavailability FV Importance 
1-N-TUCO-RP 50% 
Nominal 
1 [h] 
Gas Turbine 
(spare) 
4,64E-01 6,38E-01 
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Flow 
Gas Turbine 
(active) 
9,82E-03 3,51E-01 
Compressor 
(active) 
4,39E-03 1,57E-01 
Compressor 
(spare) 
1,13E-01 1,56E-01 
Main 
maintenance 
2,88E-02 3,96E-02 
Minor 
maintenance 
1,68E-02 2,31E-02 
Valve compressor 
spare 
4,37E-03 6,02E-03 
Valve compressor 
active leak 
1,48E-05 5,27E-04 
Valve compressor 
active spurious 
7,20E-07 2,58E-05 
Air cooler Leak 1,56E-03 1,12E-06 
Air cooler Fan 1,73E-05 1,24E-08 
Filter 1,00E-05 2,89E-13 
24[h] 
Gas Turbine 
(spare) 
4,64E-01 6,37E-01 
Gas Turbine 
(active) 
1,75E-02 3,81E-01 
Compressor 
(spare) 
1,13E-01 1,56E-01 
Compressor 
(active) 
6,14E-03 1,34E-01 
Main 
maintenance 
2,88E-02 3,95E-02 
Minor 
maintenance 
1,68E-02 2,31E-02 
Valve compressor 
spare 
4,37E-03 6,01E-03 
Valve compressor 
active leak 
2,31E-05 5,02E-04 
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Valve compressor 
active spurious 
2,56E-06 5,56E-05 
Air cooler Leak 3,29E-03 6,65E-06 
Air cooler Fan 1,17E-04 2,36E-07 
Filter 3,30E-05 6,24E-12 
168[h] 
Gas Turbine 
(spare) 
4,64E-01 6,38E-01 
Gas Turbine 
(active) 
6,28E-02 4,36E-01 
Compressor 
(spare) 
1,13E-01 1,56E-01 
Compressor 
(active) 
1,68E-02 1,17E-01 
Main 
maintenance 
2,88E-02 3,95E-02 
Minor 
maintenance 
1,68E-02 2,31E-02 
Valve compressor 
spare 
4,37E-03 6,01E-03 
Valve compressor 
active leak 
7,47E-05 5,19E-04 
Valve compressor 
active spurious 
1,39E-02 1,54E-04 
Air cooler Leak 1,41E-05 9,77E-05 
Air cooler Fan 7,38E-14 8,15E-06 
Filter 1,77E-04 2,86E-10 
Bypass 1 [h] 
Comp_TG CCF 2,86E-04 3,88E-01 
Gas Turbine 
(active) 
9,82E-03 1,38E-01 
Gas Turbine 
(spare) 
4,64E-01 1,28E-01 
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Compressor 
(active) 
4,39E-03 6,17E-02 
Air coolers CCF 3,19E-05 4,33E-02 
Compressor 
(spare) 
1,13E-01 3,13E-02 
Valve station leak 1,48E-05 2,00E-02 
Valve filter leak 1,48E-05 2,00E-02 
Main 
maintenance 
2,88E-02 7,93E-03 
Minor 
maintenance 
1,68E-02 4,63E-03 
Valve compressor 
spare 
4,37E-03 1,21E-03 
Valve station 
spurious 
7,21E-07 9,78E-04 
Filters CCF 2,00E-07 2,71E-04 
Valve compressor 
active leak 
1,48E-05 2,08E-04 
Valve compressor 
active spurious 
7,20E-07 1,01E-05 
Air cooler Leak 1,56E-03 3,32E-08 
Air cooler Fan 1,73E-05 3,68E-10 
Filter 1,00E-05 5,43E-17 
24[h] 
Comp_TG CCF 4,77E-04 3,43E-01 
Gas Turbine 
(active) 
1,75E-02 2,17E-01 
Gas Turbine 
(spare) 
4,64E-01 1,88E-01 
Compressor 
(active) 
6,14E-03 7,62E-02 
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Air coolers CCF 6,85E-05 4,93E-02 
Compressor 
(spare) 
1,13E-01 4,59E-02 
Valve station leak 2,31E-05 1,66E-02 
Valve filter leak 2,31E-05 1,66E-02 
Main 
maintenance 
2,88E-02 1,16E-02 
Minor 
maintenance 
1,68E-02 6,79E-03 
Valve compressor 
spare 
2,55E-06 1,84E-03 
Valve station 
spurious 
4,37E-03 1,77E-03 
Filters CCF 6,60E-07 4,75E-04 
Valve compressor 
active leak 
2,31E-05 2,86E-04 
Valve compressor 
active spurious 
2,56E-06 3,17E-05 
Air cooler Leak 3,29E-03 3,75E-07 
Air cooler Fan 1,17E-04 1,33E-08 
Filter 3,30E-05 3,41E-15 
168[h] 
Comp_TG CCF 6,28E-02 4,54E-01 
Gas Turbine 
(active) 
4,64E-01 3,68E-01 
Gas Turbine 
(spare) 
1,68E-03 2,08E-01 
Compressor 
(active) 
1,68E-02 1,21E-01 
Air co olers CCF 1,13E-01 8,99E-02 
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Compressor 
(spare) 
2,97E-04 3,69E-02 
Valve station leak 2,88E-02 2,28E-02 
Valve filter leak 1,68E-02 1,33E-02 
Main 
maintenance 
7,48E-05 9,28E-03 
Minor 
maintenance 
7,48E-05 9,28E-03 
Valve compressor 
spare 
4,37E-03 3,47E-03 
Valve station 
spurious 
1,41E-05 1,75E-03 
Filters CCF 7,47E-05 5,40E-04 
Valve compressor 
active leak 
3,54E-06 4,39E-04 
Valve compressor 
active spurious 
1,41E-05 1,02E-04 
Air cooler Leak 1,39E-02 2,17E-05 
Air cooler Fan 7,38E-04 1,15E-06 
Filter 1,77E-04 4,87E-13 
0% 
Nominal 
Flow 
1 [h] 
V_bypass 4,38E-03 1,00E+00 
Comp_TG CCF 2,86E-04 3,68E-01 
Gas Turbine 
(active) 
9,82E-03 1,66E-01 
Gas Turbine 
(spare) 
4,64E-01 1,62E-01 
Compressor 
(active) 
4,39E-03 7,44E-02 
Compressor 
(spare) 
3,19E-05 4,11E-02 
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Air coolers CCF 1,13E-01 3,95E-02 
Valve station leak 1,48E-05 1,90E-02 
Valve filter leak 1,48E-05 1,90E-02 
Main 
maintenance 
2,88E-02 7,52E-03 
Minor 
maintenance 
1,68E-02 4,39E-03 
Valve compressor 
spare 
4,37E-03 1,53E-03 
Valve station 
spurious 
7,21E-07 9,27E-04 
Filters CCF 2,00E-07 2,57E-04 
Valve compressor 
active leak 
1,48E-05 2,50E-04 
Valve compressor 
active spurious 
7,20E-07 1,22E-05 
Air cooler Leak 1,56E-03 3,15E-08 
Air cooler Fan 1,73E-05 3,49E-10 
Filter 1,00E-05 5,15E-17 
24[h] 
V_bypass 4,38E-03 1,00E+00 
Comp_TG CCF 4,77E-04 3,18E-01 
Gas Turbine 
(active) 
1,75E-02 2,55E-01 
Gas Turbine 
(spare) 
4,64E-01 2,32E-01 
Compressor 
(active) 
6,14E-03 8,96E-02 
Compressor 
(spare) 
1,13E-01 5,66E-02 
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Air coolers CCF 6,85E-05 4,56E-02 
Valve station leak 2,31E-05 1,54E-02 
Valve filter leak 2,31E-05 1,54E-02 
Main 
maintenance 
2,88E-02 1,08E-02 
Minor 
maintenance 
1,68E-02 6,29E-03 
Valve compressor 
spare 
4,37E-03 2,19E-03 
Valve station 
spurious 
2,55E-06 1,70E-03 
Filters CCF 6,60E-07 4,39E-04 
Valve compressor 
active leak 
2,31E-05 3,37E-04 
Valve compressor 
active spurious 
2,56E-06 3,73E-05 
Air cooler Leak 3,29E-03 3,48E-07 
Air cooler Fan 1,17E-04 1,23E-08 
Filter 3,30E-05 3,16E-15 
168[h] 
V_bypass 4,38E-03 1,00E+00 
Comp_TG CCF 6,28E-02 4,97E-01 
Gas Turbine 
(active) 
4,64E-01 4,23E-01 
Gas Turbine 
(spare) 
1,68E-03 1,80E-01 
Compressor 
(active) 
1,68E-02 1,33E-01 
Compressor 
(spare) 
1,13E-01 1,03E-01 
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Air coolers CCF 2,97E-04 3,18E-02 
Valve station leak 2,88E-02 1,97E-02 
Valve filter leak 1,68E-02 1,15E-02 
Main 
maintenance 
7,48E-05 8,00E-03 
Minor 
maintenance 
7,48E-05 8,00E-03 
Valve compressor 
spare 
4,37E-03 3,99E-03 
Valve station 
spurious 
1,41E-05 1,51E-03 
Filters CCF 7,47E-05 5,92E-04 
Valve compressor 
active leak 
3,54E-06 3,79E-04 
Valve compressor 
active spurious 
1,41E-05 1,11E-04 
Air cooler Leak 1,39E-02 1,87E-05 
Air cooler Fan 7,38E-04 9,91E-07 
Filter 1,77E-04 4,20E-13 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
3.7 Results and Conclusions 
Table 13 provides a summary of results for all configurations and 24h Logistic Delay. Results are given in 
terms of Unavailability (Q), Expected Number of Failures (ENF), Downtime (h/year) and Average Downtime (h), 
considering both Corrective and Preventive Maintenance contributions. 
Table 13 - Corrective + Preventive Maintenance: Unavailability (Q), Expected Number of Failures (ENF), Downtime [h/year], 
Average Downtime [h]. 
Corrective + Preventive Maintenance – 24 hr Logistic Delay Time 
Typical Parameter 
Damage Class (nominal flow percentage) 
66% 50% 33% Bypass 0% 
1: N-TUCO- Q X 3,46E-02 X 1,39E-03 6,58E-06 
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RP 
ENF 
[occ/year] 
X 5,07E+00 X 2,65E-01 1,31E-03 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X 3,03E+02 X 1,22E+01 5,76E-02 
Average 
Downtime 
[h] 
X 5,96E+01 X 4,59E+01 4,39E+01 
1a: 4-TUCO-
RP 
Q 5,52E-02 X 1,32E-03 1,08E-03 4,76E-08 
ENF 
[occ/year] 
8,12E+00 X 3,65E-01 1,67E-01 7,35E-06 
Down Time 
[h/year] 
4,84E+02 X 1,16E+01 9,46E+00 4,17E-04 
Average 
Down Time 
[h] 
5,96E+01 X 3,17E+01 5,67E+01 5,67E+01 
2: N-MOCO-
RP 
Q X 3,67E-03 X 6,96E-04 3,07E-07 
ENF 
[occ/year] 
X 4,99E-01 X 1,06E-01 4,69E-05 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X 3,21E+01 X 6,09E+00 2,69E-03 
Average 
Downtime 
[h] 
X 6,44E+01 X 5,76E+01 5,73E+02 
2a: 4-MOCO-
RP 
Q 5,94E-03 X 5,09E-05 7,72E-04 3,38E-08 
ENF 
[occ/year] 
8,06E-01 X 1,32E-02 1,14E-01 5,01E-06 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
5,20E+01 X 4,46E-01 6,76E+00 2,96E-04 
Average 
Downtime 
[h] 
6,46E+01 X 3,38E+01 5,93E+01 5,91E+01 
3: 2-TUCO-
RN 
Q X 1,31E-01 X 5,77E-03 2,54E-05 
ENF 
[occ/year] 
X 7,44E+00 X 4,94E-01 2,16E-03 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X 1,14E+03 X 5,06E+01 2,22E-01 
Average 
Downtime 
[h] 
X 1,54E+02 X 1,02E+02 1,03E+02 
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4: 2-MOCO-
RN 
Q X 4,24E-02 X 5,77E-03 2,54E-05 
ENF 
[occ/year] 
X 2,56E+00 X 4,94E-01 2,16E-03 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X 3,72E+02 X 5,06E+01 2,22E-01 
Average 
Downtime 
[h] 
X 1,45E+02 X 1,02E+02 1,03E+02 
5: 2-TUCO-
RT 
Q X X X 1,14E-03 5,02E-06 
ENF 
[occ/year] 
X X X 1,40E-01 6,14E-04 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X X X 1,00E+01 4,39E-02 
Average 
Downtime 
[h] 
X X X 7,15E+01 7,15E+01 
6: 2-MOCO-
RT 
Q X X X 2,31E-03 1,22E-05 
ENF 
[occ/year] 
X X X 3,33E-01 1,77E-03 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X X X 2,02E+01 1,07E-01 
Average 
Downtime 
[h] 
X X X 6,06E+01 6,05E+01 
7-1-TUCO-
RN 
Q X X X 6,81E-02 3,06E-04 
ENF 
[occ/year] 
X X X 3,80E+00 1,66E-02 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X X X 5,96E+02 2,68E+00 
Average 
Downtime 
[h] 
X X X 1,57E+02 1,61E+02 
8-1-MOCO-
RN 
Q X X X 2,19E-02 9,64E-05 
ENF 
[occ/year] 
X X X 1,36E+00 5,94E-03 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X X X 1,92E+02 8,45E-01 
Average X X X 1,41E+02 1,42E+02 
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Downtime 
[h] 
LNG Storage 
Q 3,48E-03 1,12E-02 1,95E-05 X 3,08E-04 
ENF 
[occ/year] 
2,54E-01 2,13E+00 2,73E-03 X 5,40E-02 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
3,05E+01 9,83E+01 1,71E-01 X 2,70E+00 
Average 
Downtime 
[h] 
1,20E+02 4,61E+01 6,25E+01 X 5,01E+01 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
In the case of compressor stations and for each configuration (except stations with 4 compressors, 1a-4-
TUCO-RP and 2a-4-MOCO-RP), the Unavailability (Q) becomes lower as the Damage Class becomes more 
severe (the Damage Class severity increases in this order: 50% nominal flow (where applicable), “bypass”, 0% 
flow, the Expected Number of Failures (ENF) following the same trend. In the case of stations with 4 
compressors the unavailability due to “by-pass” Damage Class is often higher (especially in case of electrical 
motor driven compressors) due to the “33% nominal flow” Damage Class. This result can be explained with 
the high importance of CCF and leakages from filters and station valves that are pertinent for “bypass” and 
0% nominal flow Damage Classes but not for the 33% Damage Class; in fact these failures lead to the 
complete loss of the station capability and not to degraded production scenarios. These considerations apply 
both to cases in which preventive and corrective maintenance have been taken into account and to cases in 
which only preventive maintenance has been considered.  
Configurations in which the compressors are driven by electric motors are affected by lower unavailability and 
lower Expected Number of Failures compared to those having the same configuration but gas – turbine driven 
compressors; the reason is the higher availability of electric motors.  
For Damage Classes 0% Nominal Flow and “bypass”, 2-TUCO-RN (two gas turbine-driven compressors, no 
redundancy) shows a higher availability than typical 5-2-TUCO-RT (two gas turbine-driven compressors, total 
redundancy); the reason is the higher unavailability (fail on demand) of compressors, gas turbines and 
electrical motors when set in stand – by mode. The same consideration apply to 2-MOCO-RT compared to 2-
MOCO-RT.  The worst configurations in terms of Unavailability and Expected Number of Failures (comparing 
compressors with the same driver gas turbine or electrical motor), are those characterised by single gas 
compressors, i.e. 1-TUCO-RN and 1-MOCO-RN.  
Regarding LNG Facilities, low pressure branches (formed by tank and low pressure pump) and high pressure 
branches (formed by high pressure pump and vaporizer) are present; low pressure branches have a higher 
functional redundancy (each branch supplies 33% of the nominal flow of the facility: 4 branches are present, 
one spare) than high pressure branches (each branch supplies 50% of the nominal flow of the facility: 3 
branches are present, one spare). 66% and 33% Nominal Flow Damage Classes are due to failure in low 
pressure branches of the plant whereas 50% Nominal Flow Damage Class is due to failure in the high 
pressure branches; 0% Nominal Flow Damage Class can be due to failures in both locations. The 66% and 
50% nominal flow Damage Classes have a Minimal Cut Set (MCS) of order 2; the 33% nominal flow Damage 
Class has a Minimal Cut Set of order 3; the 0% Damage Class has a Minimal Cut Set of order 1 due to 
influence of CCF (Common Cause Failure).  
Pumps and their drivers set on high and low pressure branches have been considered identical. The higher 
unavailability (considering failure, repair rate and test interval) of vaporizers compared to that of tanks 
justifies the lower unavailability in the 50% nominal flow Damage Class than in the 66% nominal flow 
Damage Class, given the equal minimum order of MCS present.  
The influence of shut-down due to preventive maintenance appears stronger for configurations with no 
redundancy (2-TUCO-RN, 2-MOCO-RN, 1-TUCO-RN, 1-MOCO-RN) than for configuration with redundancy.  
The increase of Logistic Delay Times increases the unavailability of the systems, by about an order of 
magnitude, whereas the expected number of failures is less affected by the change of this parameter. 
 
52 
4 Natural Hazards 
4.1 Scope and methodology 
Possible effects of natural hazards on compressor stations, UGS sites and LNG facilities have been 
investigated. Flooding and seismic hazards are mainly analysed along with other hazards such as external 
fires (forest, nearby facilities), extreme winds (hurricane, tornado), extreme precipitation (in the form of rain, 
hail or snow), extreme temperatures, electromagnetic phenomena (lightning, solar flare), air contamination 
(salt storm, sand storm), sea storms, tsunamis (for LNG offshore terminals) and extreme humidity (mist, white 
frost and drought).  
In order to evaluate effects of natural hazard on the various facilities a 4 step methodology has been applied: 
 Historical investigation: a research on accident data banks has been performed in order to identify 
past accidents occurred on this kind of facilities, caused by natural hazards. This investigation allows 
a preliminary overview to identify the typical hazards able to compromise operations in gas 
compressor stations, the severity of the events and the related effects on the facilities; 
 Lessons learned: interview with experts, in order to catch operator’s experience in case of natural 
disasters to identify the effects on the station operations, timing for recovery and restart, affected 
components, etc.; 
 Natural Hazard classification in EU: this step consists in the identification of the typical approaches, 
in EU, to classify and map natural hazards, in order to set a coherence between the grade of natural 
risk in a specific location and the related enhancement of the gas station Damage Class probability; 
 Definition of a set of “worsening factors”, for each specific natural hazard, for the corrections of the 
Damage Class probabilities estimated in Task 2. 
4.2 Historical investigation  
A research on accident databases, news, reports and academic articles has been performed in order to 
identify in which way operations in compressor stations, UGS sites and LNG facilities have been compromised 
by natural causes, and in particular to find a relation between the sustained damage and the severity of the 
events for each type of hazard.  
4.2.1 Gas Compressor Stations  
Several data banks have been taken into consideration. The FACTS (Failure and Accidents Technical 
information System) database created by TNO at the end of the seventies does not contain information 
pertinent to the incidents object of the present investigation (TNO, 2015). Similarly, the JRC-developed eMARS 
(Major Accident Reporting System) does not provide data suitable for the purpose of this analysis (EC-JRC, 
2016). The EGIG database only records incidents on gas transmission pipelines while incidents involving 
equipment or components such as valves and compressors are not recorded (EGIG, 2015).  
Relevant information is present in the database created by PHMSA - Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 2014), which requires pipeline 
operators to submit reports for incidents following the directives issued by title 49 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (49 CFR Parts 191, 195), published in the Federal Register by the Department of Transportation 
of the Federal Government of the United States (United States Department of Transportation, 2014).  
The database contains reports related to the entire gas transmission pipeline system, including pipelines, 
control and relief valves, metering stations, vessels and compressor stations. It contains a total of 2869 
reports recorded between the year 1986 and September 2014. Incidents which happened between 1970 and 
1986 were also recorded but almost all their reports did not include details about their cause.  
Filtering the database by cause of accident, 293 accidents have been identified as caused by natural events, 
22 of which related to compression stations.  
Figure 24 shows how the number of reported failures by natural cause for compressors compares to that for 
other components. The incidents reported for compressor stations include those involving compressors, 
control and emergency shutdown systems and any other auxiliary equipment present in the facilities. It is 
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evident how pipelines are, among the components of the entire transmission system, the most affected by 
natural hazards. 
Figure 24 - Failure of components caused by natural hazards. 
 
Source: PHMSA, 2014. 
 
In total, 206 reports have been filed for compressor stations. In Figure 25 they are subdivided based on their 
cause. This diagram underlines that the contribution of natural causes to the total number of failures is 
relatively small compared to that of technical failures, and quite similar to that induced by incorrect 
operations or other human intervention. Analysing in detail how natural events affected the entire gas 
transmission system provides very useful indications regarding the different vulnerability of compressor 
stations to different natural events, compared to that of the entire system. 
Figure 25 - Failure of compressor stations induced by different causes. 
 
Source: PHMSA, 2014. 
 
Most of the 293 failures of gas transmission systems have been caused by soil displacement (Figure 26), 
largely in the form of landslide, mudslide or subsidence. Only one reported case was explicitly attributed to an 
earthquake; it is however possible that earth movements identified as cause of incidents might have been 
caused themselves by earthquakes without specification. 
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Figure 26 - Failure of compressor stations induced by different causes. 
 
Source: PHMSA, 2014. 
 
Compressor stations (22 reported cases) appear to have failed for quite different causes. In particular, 
lightning strikes and low temperature have been responsible together for over 60% of the filed reports 
(Figure 27). 
Figure 27 - Failure of compressor stations caused by natural hazards. 
 
Source: PHMSA, 2014. 
 
The category labelled as “severe weather conditions” includes those reports for which it has not been 
indicated a specific cause and may regard strong winds, heavy rain, flooding or a combination of them. The 
review of articles and publications confirmed the difference in vulnerability between compressor stations and 
the rest of the transmission system.  
Several researches have been conducted on seismic hazards. Based on observation of past events, 
compressors do not appear to be very vulnerable and generally have performed well. Most problems were 
usually caused by weak anchorage to the supporting foundations, insufficient tie-down of equipment, falling 
debris and failure of electrical supplies (United States Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1992). A 
study conducted by the American Lifelines Alliance (ALA) on almost 130 compressors indicated no signs of 
failure to the compressor units themselves (American Lifelines Alliance, 2005). Other references (Pipeline and 
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Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 2014) confirm the fact that gas compressor stations are designed 
and constructed conservatively, after proper site selection. Transmission pipelines, however, cross large areas 
and often through zones of potentially unstable soils. These same reasons justify the lower number of cases 
reported as caused by heavy rain and flooding. While pipelines are often laid in proximity of water streams or 
have to cross them, compressor stations can be positioned in adequately selected sites, where the flooding 
hazard is lower.  
The results appear to indicate that the emergency shutdown and relief systems are subjected to frequent 
failure. In particular, lightning hazards impacted on the ESD system, inducing spurious intervention of the 
valves, or interrupting supplies of electrical power to the system and causing its intervention.  
Low temperatures, have been responsible for the incorrect functioning of the system’s valves which have 
either been held blocked in closed position or induced to open by ice build-up. It must be pointed out however, 
that these incidents might have been avoided with better facility design or maintenance intervention to 
prevent liquid accumulation inside the equipment. The weather conditions should not be accounted as primary 
cause whenever evident flaws in the design, improper operations or pre-existing damage conditions were 
present.  
The reports which include shutdown and restart times for incidents caused by lightning and low temperatures, 
indicate downtime shorter than five hours for all cases. In all cases manual intervention was required to re-
establish normal functioning.  
In conclusion, the historical analysis and literature review revealed that gas transmission systems are mostly 
affected by seismic, flooding and lightning hazards. For compressor stations statistics are poor (22 accidents 
due to natural hazards); the cases of compressor station impairment due to natural hazards is a small 
percentage of the total number of accidents due to natural causes that have damaged the whole gas 
transmission system (8% of the cases) with a prevalence of flooding, lightening, low temperatures, severe 
weather conditions. Low temperatures, as discussed here above, do not represent the initiator of the accident 
but such climate conditions acted as the triggering condition in presence of previous design or maintenance 
errors. For what concerns extreme weather conditions, most of the accidents involve flooding conditions. 
4.2.2 UGS Sites 
The considerations made for gas pipeline’s compressor stations have been considered to be applicable also to 
underground gas storage facilities, regarding the impact of natural events on them. A research has been 
conducted to assess the impact of compressors failure on the functioning of the entire UGS facility.  
Important information regarding past experience was found in a study conducted by the British Geological 
Survey for the Health and Safety Executive (Evans, 2007). The incidents reported in the study are summarized 
in Table 14. Only one reported incident was caused by the failure of compressor units, not triggered by a 
natural event. The impact of the compressor system seems, at least regarding incidents of important entity, 
negligible. 
Table 14 - Documented incidents or problems at UGS facilities – Natural Gas Storage. 
Cause of accident 
Storage type 
TOTAL 
Depleted 
reservoir 
Aquifer Salt cavern 
Well, casing failure 5 2 3 10 
Valve, pipes, wellhead, compressor failure 3 -- -- 3 
Repair, testing, maintenance -- 2 -- 2 
Inadvertent intrusion 1 1 -- 2 
Overpressure, overfilling -- -- -- 0 
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Geology related 6 12 5 23 
Other, not determined 1 -- -- 1 
TOTAL 16 17 8 41 
Source: British Geological Survey, 2007. 
Intense seismic activity damaged the well infrastructure or the geological integrity of the underground 
system. Geology-related incidents often caused gas migration to the surface, either through rock 
discontinuities, faults or failure of the cavity roof or salt creep. The failure rate due to reservoir formation 
damage in UGS facilities has been estimated in the order of 10-5 failures per well year (UK Health and Safety 
Executive, 2008). The consequence of this type of failure is the release of stored gas with a mass discharge 
rate of 10-4 kg/s over an estimated area of hundreds of square meters. In major hazard terms this equates 
to a risk that can be considered negligible.  
A much larger risk is posed by the failure of the well that connects the cavity to the surface, having similar 
failure rate but a mass discharge rate estimated in the order of 250-550 kg/s (Watson, Metcalfe, & Bond, 
2008).  
Most incidents registered worldwide in depleted oil and gas fields, took place in California (69 %). This is 
largely due to the ongoing seismic activity and to the vast number of wells drilled in the past to produce the 
reservoir now used for storage. Therefore, these results can be relevant to underground gas storage in those 
areas of Europe where high seismic activity is met, i.e. Italy and Balkans. It should be noted that underground 
gas storage activity has been documented to trigger induced seismicity and subsidence. The recorded events 
have usually been of low intensity and unable to damage the facilities, however operations have sometimes 
been interrupted due to concerns of the surrounding community.  
In conclusion, in accident reports and data there is no evidence of significant failure/unavailability of the UGS 
due to compressor failures depending on natural events. No other data source were found regarding the role 
of gas compression failures for UGS. It is safe to assume that the conclusions reached from the historical 
analysis performed for compressor stations installed along pipelines can be extended to these facilities. 
4.2.3 LNG Facilities 
The research for historical data lead to a study conducted by GIIGNL (International Group of Liquefied Natural 
Gas Imports), an association born in 1971 with 19 member companies and now counting 75. GIIGNL collects 
and analyses safety incidents which happen on facilities controlled by its members, but also those in the 
public domain concerning companies which are not directly taking part in the survey. The aim of the survey 
was to identify incidents of natural gas release and other incidents of concern for both liquefaction and 
regasification facilities, their severity and potential consequences, and finally to indicate under what 
circumstances and how frequently they occur. 328 incidents have been reported for the period 1965 to 2007, 
corresponding to a cumulative operation time of 1320 site-years (International Group of Liquefied Natural 
Gas Importers, 2016). 
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Table 15 - Historical Incidents Frequencies. 
Period Incidents Operating site-years Frequency 
1965 - 1974 15 44 0,34 
1975 - 1984 52 179 0,29 
1985 - 1994 94 327 0,29 
1995 - 2000 85 191 0,45 
2001 - 2007 82 579 0,14 
TOTAL 328 1320 0,25 
Source: GIIGNL, 2016. 
The incidents have been aggregated as induced by main primary causes, defined as design/construction (D/C), 
operation/maintenance (O/M), external and unknown. Incidents caused by problems with the initial design and 
installation of the equipment were grouped under design/construction. Those caused by equipment failure 
during operation, operator error, poor procedures and poor maintenance under operation/maintenance. Figure 
28 shows the major impact of design/construction and operation/maintenance groups on the overall number 
of incidents. It is evident how external causes, including natural ones, contribute for about 10% of the total. 
Similarly to what was found for compressor stations, most incidents appear to be triggered by technical or 
human-caused failures. 
Figure 28 - Incidents by cause. 
 
Source: GIIGNL, 2016. 
The survey contains information on incidents of any proportion, with around 60% of them reported to have 
resulted in a gas release of less than 100kg.  
Concerning the effects of natural hazards on LNG plants the following considerations can be drawn 
considering that only seismic and Tsunami impacts have been reported. LNG facilities are located close to the 
coastline, hence the design must take into account, among others, the possibility of a tsunami triggered by an 
offshore earthquake or massive subsea landslides. A number of very large and large earthquakes have 
occurred with epicentres in areas that could potentially affect LNG facilities. Of the 16 very large earthquakes 
reported, only 3 caused significant damage. 
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Table 16 - Damage due to earthquakes. 
Type Location and Year Terminal Description Damage to Facilities 
Very large 
earthquakes 
Japan 2011 Minato LNG 
Magnitude: 9.0            
PGA: 0.615g 
Stretching of tie rod of gas holder. 
Tsunami damage 
Japan 1995 
Senboku, 
Himeji 
Magnitude: 7.3              
PGA: 0.818g 
Small sinkage of foundations due to 
soil liquefaction 
Chile 2010 GNL Mejilones 
Magnitude: 8.8                    
PGA: 0.78g 
No reported damage 
Chile 2010 GNL Quintero 
Magnitude: 8.8              
PGA: 0.78g 
Occurred during construction of LNG 
tanks, which had seismic isolators. 
Tanks undamaged. Only slight 
damage to one cargo unloading arm, 
counterweight plates required to be 
adjusted 
Chile 2012 GNL Quintero Magnitude: 6.5 
Regasification operations resumed 
same day after power was restored 
Samoa 2009 
Eastern 
Australia, US 
West Coast 
Magnitude: 8.1 
LNG facilities not yet operational 
when earthquake occurred 
Sumatra 2007 
Indonesia, 
Japan, South 
Korea, India 
Magnitude: 8.5 No reported damage 
Sumatra 2005 
Indonesia, 
Japan, South 
Korea, India 
Magnitude: 8.6 No reported damage 
Sumatra 2004 
Indonesia, 
Japan, South 
Korea, India 
Magnitude: 9.1 No reported damage 
Alaska 1964 Kenai Magnitude: 9.2 LNG facilities not yet operational 
Large 
earthquakes 
US (Virginia) 2011 
Cove Point, 
Savannah 
Magnitude: 5.8 No reported damage 
Spain 2011 
Barcelona, 
Huelva, 
Cartagena 
Magnitude: 5.1 No reported damage 
Alaska 2011 Kenai Magnitude: 6.8 No reported damage 
Italy 2009 La Spezia Magnitude: 6.3 No reported damage 
Italy 2009 Rovigo Magnitude: 6.3 LNG facilities not yet operational 
China 2008 
East and 
south coastal 
terminals 
Magnitude: 7.9 No reported damage 
Source: GIIGNL, 2016. 
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Several events of major relevance have not caused any damage, however it should be noticed that 
earthquake magnitudes refer to epicentres and therefore the effects felt at the facilities located at a certain 
distance may have been less severe according to seismic attenuation. Some of these earthquakes have 
generated Tsunamis. Only one of the three reported cases resulted in damage to LNG facilities. In this case 
the marine LNG unloading facilities and the inland LNG storage tank were undamaged. Secondary pipe 
supports with shallow foundations and many instruments have been affected. The positive response of 
Minato plant to a flooding event of such extent confirms the effectiveness of Tsunami design resistance. 
Table 17 - Damage due to Tsunami. 
Name Terminal Description Damage to Facilities 
Japan 2011 Minato 
4 meter over usual tide 
level for 1 hour 
Facilities not supported by pile foundations 
greatly damaged. 
Sumatra 2004 Osaka 1m over usual tide level No damage 
Chile 2012 Mejilones 0,5m over usual tide level No damage. Unloading operations interrupted 
Source: GIIGNL, 2016. 
In conclusion this survey appears to provide very positive feedback regarding the resistance of LNG plants. 
Even very large earthquakes or the associated tsunamis have never caused incidents able to significantly 
compromise LNG facilities operations. Seismic design standards appear to properly include safety margins 
and Tsunami resistance design has proven quite effective in protecting facilities from flooding by placing 
sensitive systems above the potential flood level or behind adequate walls. The report does not contain 
specific comments on compression and pumping systems, furthermore, no incidents caused by other than 
seismic activity or tsunamis have been reported. It is safe to assume that naturally induced incidents involving 
compressors or pumps did not or occur or produced damage unable to affect operations. 
4.3 Lessons Learned 
Literature review provided a preliminary overview on the vulnerability of the gas transmission system, 
including that of compressor stations. The table presented below, extracted from a report presented by the 
American Lifelines Alliance, shows the degree of vulnerability for equipment and components of gas 
transmission systems for different natural hazards (American Lifelines Alliance, 2005). In particular it 
provides complete information for earthquake shaking and flooding.  
Based on the historical analysis, it has been concluded that the analysis should be performed on hazards 
involving earthquakes, flooding and lightning strikes. The historical analysis contained reports about incidents 
related to hurricanes, however this type of hazard has not been taken into consideration as Europe is not 
historically hit by such events. Other hazards such as external fires, air pollution, extreme hail or snow 
precipitation have been considered to have negligible impact on the unavailability of compressor stations 
across Europe and have therefore not been included in the study. Risk assessments specific to the single 
facility should be performed whenever additional hazards are present. 
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Table 18 - Degrees of vulnerability of gas transmission system components: H=High, M=Moderate and L=Low. 
Natural 
Hazards 
Degree of Vulnerability 
Pipeline 
Comp. 
Stations 
Processing 
Facilities 
Storage 
Tanks 
Control 
Systems 
Maintenance 
and Operation 
Buildings and 
Equipment 
Regulation/ 
Metering 
Stations 
Service 
Lines/ 
Connections 
Earthquake 
Shaking 
L M M H M H L M 
Earthquake 
Permanent 
Ground 
Deformation 
(fault rupture, 
liquefaction, 
landslide and 
settlement) 
H - - L - - L M 
Ground 
Movements 
(landslide, 
frost heave, 
settlement) 
H - - L - - L M 
Flooding 
(river, storm 
surge, 
tsunami) 
L H H M H H H M 
Wind 
(hurricane, 
tornado) 
L - - - L L - - 
Icing L - - - - - - - 
Collateral 
Hazard: Blast 
or Fire 
M H H H M L L M 
Source: ALA, 2005. 
4.3.1 Expert judgement  
An industry expert in design and operation & maintenance of natural gas compressor stations in Italy owned 
by the main Transmission System Operator, and with more than 30 years of in the field, confirmed the results 
obtained regarding the vulnerability of compressor stations to seismic, flooding and lightning hazards. In 
particular he reported how the two earthquakes which occurred in Northern Italy in 2012, of magnitude 5.9 
and 5.8, caused no damage to compressor stations located in the region. He however reported that 
compressors have been briefly shut down as a precaution. Regarding flooding, he recalled that in some 
occasions temporary protection had been put in place, to avoid water reaching sensitive parts of the facility. 
Facilities built in areas particularly exposed to flooding hazard are built on elevated foundations. Lightning 
strikes have been reported as relatively frequent and potentially able to induce damage, for instance igniting 
gas being vented.  
4.4 Natural Hazard classification in EU  
For flooding, seismic and lightning hazards a survey on European classification, in terms of severity and 
recurrence intervals, has been performed. The effects on the studied installations of phenomena 
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characterized by different severity and recurrence interval thresholds commonly used in Europe were 
evaluated. For reference, also data referred to not European Countries have been considered.  
4.4.1 Seismic  
Earthquakes are seismic movements of the solid earth that are mainly caused by tectonic activities. Most of 
the world’s earthquakes occur in areas where large tectonic plates meet but may also occur within plates. 
Earthquakes can also occur because of impacts such as the collapse of underground cavities. Human-induced 
explosions, like tunnelling works, can also create local earthquakes, meaning that earthquakes can occur in all 
terrestrial and submarine areas. Earthquakes can also trigger other hazards, such as landslides, tsunamis and 
avalanches. 
Seismic events are arguably foremost in minds when geological hazards are mentioned, so the earthquake 
hazard is relatively well known and is usually represented by hazard curves that relate seismic parameters 
such as peak ground acceleration or spectral acceleration to the related exceedance probability for a given 
period of exposure and for a certain location.  
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) is a measure of the maximum acceleration recorded by instrumentation at 
the surface of the ground during an earthquake, while Spectral Acceleration (SA) is an index which allows a 
better evaluation the effects of earthquakes on buildings. The natural vibration period of a building indicates 
how vulnerable it is to ground motion of a certain period and tall buildings, characterized by longer natural 
vibration periods, are not greatly affected by short period seismic waves. In the same way, short buildings are 
not largely damaged by long period waves (United States Geological Survey, 2014). 
The seismic hazard is usually described for each country by National agencies with zonation maps which 
subdivide the national territories into seismic zones based on the local hazard, and the EU has funded 
dedicated projects to develop methodologies and models able to evaluate earthquake hazard in Europe, to 
provide a homogeneous input for the correct seismic safety assessment for critical industry.  
The Global Seismological Hazard Assessment Project (GSHAP) produced maps showing the maximum PGA 
values to be expected in a 50 year period, based on historical earthquake locations, frequency and 
magnitudes as well as known fault lines. A hazard risk map was published in 2004, identifying the NUTS 3 
regions most at risk, with FP7 project SHARE (Seismic Hazard Assessment in Europe) aiming at improving 
earthquake hazard maps by taking into account the latest research and observations (SHARE, 2014).  
SHARE produced a unified framework with a computational infrastructure and an integrated probabilistic 
seismic hazard assessment model which resulted in over sixty time-independent European Seismic Hazard 
Maps. Results are available for return periods between 73 and 4975 years and at least twelve different 
spectral PGA values, covering the whole Euro-Mediterranean region, including Turkey. The construction of 
these maps, such as the one illustrated in Figure 29, involved focusing on the geologic knowledge for the 
description of events with longer time horizons and seismological data for shorter ones (SHARE, 2014). 
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Figure 29 - Peak ground acceleration, 10% exceedance probability in 50 years, 475 years return time. 
 
Source: SHARE, 2014. 
The EN1998 Eurocode 8 “Design of structures for earthquake resistance” regulation intends to regulate 
earthquake proof building design in Europe (Lubkowski & Duan, 2001). In order to evaluate consequences on 
infrastructures, the suggestions contained in Eurocode 8 on which return times should be appropriately 
considered can be followed, standard EN 1998 defining three states of damage: “near collapse”, “significant 
damage” and “damage limitation”. 
 Near Collapse (NC) - The structure is heavily damaged, with low residual lateral strength and 
stiffness, although vertical elements are still capable of sustaining vertical loads. Most non-structural 
components have collapsed. Large permanent drifts are present. The structure is near collapse and 
would probably not survive another earthquake, even of moderate intensity. 
 Significant Damage (SD) - The structure is significantly damaged, with some residual lateral strength 
and stiffness, and vertical elements are capable of sustaining vertical loads. Non-structural 
components are damaged, although partitions and infills have not failed out-of-plane. Moderate 
permanent drifts are present. The structure can sustain after-shocks of moderate intensity. The 
structure is likely to be uneconomic to repair. 
 Damage Limitation (DL) - The structure is only lightly damaged, with structural elements prevented 
from significant yielding and retaining their strength and stiffness properties. Non-structural 
components, such as partitions and infills, may show distributed cracking, but the damage could be 
economically repaired. Permanent drifts are negligible. The structure does not need any repair 
measures. 
The appropriate level of protection against the exceedance of the three states is achieved by associating to 
each a return period value (Tr) for the design seismic action. Eurocode 8 suggests Tr specific values of 
respectively 2475, 475 and 225. To better understand the damage which can be associated to a certain PGA, 
it might be useful to refer to intensity scales. Many have been created over the years to describe earthquake 
effects and correlate them to PHA values. The Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale does not have a mathematical 
basis but instead describes earthquakes based on observed effects. It is evident that for the same seismic 
event, the identified intensity may be different based on factors such as construction standards (United 
States Geological Survey, 2014). 
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Table 19 - Correlation of PGA values [%g] and Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale. 
MMI I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII 
Richter (1958) 0,1 0,1 0,3 0,7 1,4 3,1 6,5 14,1 30,1 64,3   
Medvedev & 
Sponheuer (1969) 
   
1,2 
– 
2,5 
2,5 - 
5 
5 - 
10 
10 - 
20 
20 - 
40 
40 - 
80 
   
Source: USGS, 2014. 
 
Table 20 - Modified Mercalli Intensity scale. 
Intensity Shaking Description / Damage 
I Not Felt Not felt except by a very few under especially favourable conditions. 
II Weak Felt only by a few persons at rest, especially on upper floors of buildings. 
III Weak 
Felt quite noticeably by persons indoors, especially on upper floors of buildings. 
Many people do not recognize it as an earthquake. Standing motor cars may 
rock slightly. Vibrations similar to the passing of a truck. Duration estimated. 
IV Light 
Felt indoors by many, outdoors by few during the day. At night, some awakened. 
Dishes, windows, doors disturbed; walls make cracking sound. Sensation like 
heavy truck striking building. Standing motor cars rocked noticeably. 
V Moderate 
Felt by nearly everyone; many awakened. Some dishes, windows broken. 
Unstable objects overturned. Pendulum clocks may stop. 
VI Strong 
Felt by all, many frightened. Some heavy furniture moved; a few instances of 
fallen plaster. Damage slight. 
VII 
Very 
Strong 
Damage negligible in buildings of good design and construction; slight to 
moderate in well-built ordinary structures; considerable damage in poorly built 
or badly designed structures; some chimneys broken. 
VIII Severe 
Severe Damage slight in specially designed structures; considerable damage in 
ordinary substantial buildings with partial collapse. Damage great in poorly built 
structures. Fall of chimneys, factory stacks, columns, monuments, walls. Heavy 
furniture overturned. 
IX Violent 
Damage considerable in specially designed structures; well-designed frame 
structures thrown out of plumb. Damage great in substantial buildings, with 
partial collapse. Buildings shifted off foundations. 
X Extreme 
Some well-built wooden structures destroyed; most masonry and frame 
structures destroyed with foundations. Rails bent. 
Source: USGS, 2014. 
While the seismic hazard is well known, consequences are more difficult to assess. Earthquakes can trigger 
secondary effects (like landslides), for which specific knowledge is necessary. Furthermore, in order to assess 
infrastructure vulnerability, further knowledge is required, including the location and structural engineering 
parameters of buildings, the applicable zoning and building codes, and the level of compliance with the codes, 
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this data being generally unavailable at national or European level. Ultimately, some properly justified 
assumptions will always be necessary when conducting the vulnerability assessment. 
4.4.2 Flooding  
Floods are here defined as occurrences where water overflows its natural or artificial banks onto normally dry 
land, such as a river inundating its floodplain, occurring at more or less regular intervals. In Europe floods 
occur most often in springtime, when the winter snow and ice is melting. Strong floods happen irregularly, in 
so-called re-occurrence intervals of 10, 50 or 100 years. However, these intervals are only statistical 
averages, for example the Rhine/Mosel areas were hit by 100-year return period floods at the end of 1993 
and in the beginning of 1995. Heavy summer rainfalls can also lead to floods. Floods have become an 
increasing problem for the built-up environment since human beings have started to change, straighten and 
relocate river beds, and also by settling in low lying areas close to rivers, often in natural flood prone areas. 
Also, increased soil sealing leads to a higher flood hazard, as rainwater runs off directly into the streams and 
the water mass inflow to rivers is no longer delayed by natural soil retention. Flash floods can contribute to 
river floods, or can be caused by river floods, if, for example, an embankment collapses. Flash floods can 
occur all over the European territory but are mostly bound to catchment areas and are thus integrated into 
the map of large river floods in Europe (European Parliament and Council, 2007). 
Storm surge is seawater that is pushed toward the shore by the force of the winds of a strong storm. This rise 
in water level can cause severe flooding in coastal areas, particularly when the storm tide coincides with the 
normal high tides. In northern Europe, many coastal areas lie just above or even below the mean sea level 
and the danger from storm surges is very high. Storm surges may appear in European areas, but due to the 
high winter storm probability, some parts of the North Sea and Baltic Sea shore- lines being especially 
vulnerable to this hazard. Storm surges are often closely linked to winter storms. Due to the influence of the 
coastal geology and morphology on the actual storm surge hazard, the areas with a high storm surge hazard 
are mostly located in the western, southern and eastern North Sea shores, as well as the western, northern 
and eastern Baltic Sea shores (European Exchange Circle on Flood Mapping, 2007).  
European directive 2007/60/EC “Directive on the assessment and management of flood risks” required 
Member States to perform preliminary flood risk assessments by 2011 and prepare flood hazard and flood 
risk maps by 2013. Flood hazard maps should show the extent of the flooded area, the expected water depth 
and where appropriate, the flow velocity, in low, medium (return period ≥ 100 years) and high probability 
scenarios.  
Almost all countries have released flood maps of some kind. Some have published maps containing historical 
flood data and most countries have provided maps containing information regarding flood extent, usually for 
two or three return periods, at least for the areas most exposed to flooding hazard. Flood depth maps are 
reported by several countries while only very few countries provided maps comprehensive of flow velocity. In 
some cases a combination of probability, depth and velocity is used to elaborate a danger map. Each country 
used its own methodology to produce these maps, often omitting technical details of the calculations done for 
their creation. As a result, it is impossible to create a coherent European map by aggregating the already 
existing ones released by each country.  
JRC has been working on pan-European flood hazard and risk maps for various years. These maps are 
available at a spatial scale of 100 m resolution and provide a harmonised, regional overview on flood hazard 
and risks across Europe. However, due to the spatial scale as well as to the incomplete or unavailable baseline 
data required to produce such maps, the pan-European maps cannot provide the same spatial detail and 
preciseness as the maps that will be (or have already been) produced by the Member States. 
JRC started working on approaches to generate a flood hazard map for Europe in 2007 and in 2012, an 
updated flood hazard map was produced using a cascading models approach, which currently represents the 
latest, state-of-the-art approach to generate a high resolution flood hazard map at large scales. The pan 
European flood hazard map has a 100m x 100m pixel resolution and is available for return periods of 5, 20, 
50, 100 and 200 years return period flood events. Flood risk assessment requires the integration of the 
physical impact results (flood inundation extent and depth) with information on exposure and vulnerability or 
impact. Vulnerability is appraised using flood depth-damage functions that represent the absolute amount of 
damage as a function of flood inundation depth. For different recurrence intervals, direct damage estimates 
can therefore be obtained by overlaying the flood water depth map with the land use map linked with the 
corresponding depth-damage functions. By linearly interpolating damages between different return periods, 
damage probability functions can be constructed for each grid cell. The integral of this function represents the 
expected annual damage (EAD) at the particular location due to flooding (Schmidt-Thomé & Kallio, 2006). 
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As an example of criteria to be adopted to assess flooding hazards, the current Italian situation is described. 
Italy has started implementing directive 2007/60/EC by adopting Legislative Decree D. Lgs. 49/2010, which 
requires that depth, flow rate and velocity are reported for the given return times (Gazzetta Ufficiale No. 77, 
2010). 
Table 21 - Return times proposed by Italian Legislative Decree 49/2010. 
Likelihood Directive 2007/60/CE D.Lgs. 49/2010 DPCM 1998 
Low - Tr ≤ 500 years 300 ≤ Tr ≤ 500 years 
Medium ≥ 100 years 100 ≤ Tr ≤ 200 years 100 ≤ Tr ≤ 200 years 
High - 20 ≤ Tr ≤ 50 years 20 ≤ Tr ≤ 50 years 
Source: Italian Legislative Decree 49/2010, 2010. 
 
Figure 30 - Flood Hazard in the EU. 
 
Source: Schmidt-Thomé and Kallio, 2006. 
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The proposed depth intervals to be included in the maps should increase in 0.5 meter steps starting from 0. 
Table 22 - Depth intervals proposed by Italian Legislative Decree 49/2010. 
h (m) h < 0.5 0.5 ≤ h < 1 1 ≤ h < 1.5 1.5 ≤ h < 2 h ≥ 2 
Source: Italian Legislative Decree 49/2010, 2010. 
 
The proposal takes in consideration a combination of flood depth and flow velocity to define three classes of 
damage to buildings, total destruction, partial damage and inundated (Clausen & Clark, 1990). The damage 
corresponding to each point in Figure 31 is identified by the product of water depth (d) and water velocity (v). 
 
Figure 31 - Damage as function of water depth and velocity. 
 
Source: Clausen and Clark, 1990. 
Whenever this information is available, it provides very useful additional information on the impact of 
flooding on facilities, allowing the assessment of the additional potential damage caused by debris 
transportation and water erosion. 
4.4.3 Lightning  
As mentioned above consultations with various experts with field experience resulted in the conclusions that 
the only real damage caused by hydrometeorological phenomena comes as expected from flooding but also, 
unexpectedly, from lightning. Given the relatively high number of events reported in the historical incident 
data bank a research on mapping of lightning density is available. Illustrated in Figure 32 is the average 
number of flashes observed during the period 1 January 2008 and 31 December 2012 by the Arrival Time 
Differing NETwork (ATDnet), showing the number of flashes per km2 per year (Anderson & Klugmann, 2014). 
Most European countries are equipped with a lightning location system, providing high detection efficiency 
and location accuracy. For each lightning strike the main parameters are recorded: the time of event, the 
impact point, the current intensity and polarity, and the number of subsequent strikes. The information 
recorded is integrated within the EUCLID network which archives all the lightning information into its database 
(EUCLID, 2014). 
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Figure 32 - Annual detected lightning flash density (flashes per km2 per year) 
 
Source: Euclid, 2014. 
4.5 Estimation of worsening factors  
A correlation between the severity of natural hazard and the expected damage to natural gas installations 
was sought. The idea behind this method is to first evaluate the hazard level present at a certain location 
starting from the maps discussed above. This information can then be used, knowing the compressor station’s 
vulnerability to each hazard, to estimate the potential unavailability of the plant. The vulnerability of 
compressor stations has been estimated based on existing fragility curves when available or historical 
analysis and technical evaluations in other cases.  
4.5.1 Model  
In general, the unavailability of a station at a certain location due to a natural event is calculated multiplying 
the yearly probability of occurrence of the event by the vulnerability of the plant to its effect, expressed in 
terms of time of lost functionality (RT – Repair Time).  
For seismic hazards the calculation is made by the following formula:  
𝑄seismic = ∑ 𝑓seismic𝑖  .  𝑅𝑇𝑖
𝑖
 
where Qseismic is the unavailability due to earthquakes that is given by the product of the event frequency 
(fseismic) and of the repair time (RT), summed on the i classes of return period of the seismic event.  
A similar formula has been set for flooding. Regarding lightening, the formula is simpler:  
𝑄lightning = 𝑓lightning . 𝑅𝑇lightning 
The vulnerability of each facility to each hazard might be different, based on adopted standards of 
construction and presence of mitigation devices, such as vibration dampers to attenuate seismic impacts, 
water dykes to decrease vulnerability to water flooding or lightning protection systems. Given the vast 
number of stations a unified method is proposed, designed to provide realistic or slightly conservative results 
for all stations. The sum of the obtained results provides the unavailability caused by natural hazards (Qnat). 
This value should be summed to the unavailability of 0% Flow Damage Class, for each configuration 
calculated earlier (Qtech) to determine the total unavailability (QTOT) of the system.  
𝑄nat = 𝑄seismic + 𝑄flood + 𝑄lightning 
 
68 
𝑄TOT = 𝑄nat + 𝑄tech 
In all cases a 0% nominal flow Damage Class has been assumed to be present during the entire restoration 
time. This assumption is reasonable and produces conservative results, since in some cases other classes, 
such as bypass or 50% nominal flow, might be reached before full recovery of the system’s functionality. In 
particular, in case of seismic activity it is safe to assume that the flow is stopped as a precaution, and 
especially considering the high vulnerability of pipelines to ground deformations and the likely consequent gas 
leakage. Similarly, in presence of flooding hazard the preventive shutdown of machines has been assumed 
given the high vulnerability of machines and electrical control equipment to water. Regarding lightning strikes, 
the assumption finds support in the historical analysis which described how lightning activity has caused 
spurious intervention of the emergency shut-down system, and gas has been vented to the atmosphere.  
The proposed methodology can be applied to compressor stations placed along gas transmission pipelines 
and in underground gas storage sites. LNG facilities showed to have much greater resistance to the effects of 
both seismic and flooding hazards. The contribution of natural events on the unavailability of their 
compression or pumping systems can be safely be considered negligible if compared to that caused by 
technical failures.  
4.5.1.1 Seismic  
The unavailability of a station at a certain location due to seismic activity is calculated multiplying the yearly 
probability of occurrence of seismic events by the vulnerability of the plant to their effects. As described 
above, the first step involves consulting hazard maps to know the seismic activity in the area of interest.  
The hazard maps available on the European Facility for Earthquake Hazard and Risk portal (www.efehr.org) 
allow to estimate the PGA values in a certain area for a given return period. The return periods (Tr) for which 
maps are available are 73, 102, 475, 975 and 2475 years (EFEHR, 2014). 
Table 23 - Return periods and expected annual probability of exceedance. 
Tr Pi 
73 0,013605 
102 0,009756 
475 0,002103 
975 0,001025 
2475 0,000404 
Source: EFEHR, 2014. 
The annual probability of exceedance can be calculated as P=1-e(-1/Tr) and can otherwise be approximated by 
P=1/Tr.  
When available, information for all return periods should be used. Neglecting part of it may lead to 
underestimated results of unavailability. The application of at least three classes is recommended when data 
are available. Table 23 will be used, here below, to estimate the frequency of occurrence of each return 
period class. The calculation of the resulting damage, expressed as repair time is estimated as follows.  
The functionality of compressor stations, in case of seismic events, has been evaluated based on fragility 
curves developed by the Applied Technology Council in the ATC-13 report and found in the FEMA’s HAZUS 
earthquake technical manual (Hazus, 2012). These curves show the probability that a certain damage state is 
reached or overcome as function of PGA values, for anchored components, designed with special seismic tie 
downs and tiebacks, and unanchored ones with normal requirements. It should be noted that the manual 
contains curves built for water pumping equipment and later suggests that they can be considered valid also 
for both oil pumping and gas compression systems. Figures 33 and 34 illustrate the probability to suffer a 
certain damage depending on the magnitude of the earthquake, respectively for unanchored and anchored 
components. 
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Figure 33 - Probability of damage state exceedance, for unanchored components, as function of PGA. 
 
Source: Hazus, 2012. 
 
Figure 34 - Probability of damage state exceedance, for anchored components, as function of PGA. 
 
Source: Hazus, 2012. 
 
Restoration functions are provided by the Hazus® 2012 report in terms of mean and standard deviations.  
Table 24 - Restoration functions for compressor stations. 
Damage State Mean [days] σ [days] 
slight/minor 0,9 0,3 
moderate 3,1 2,7 
extensive 13,5 10 
complete 35 18 
Source: Hazus, 2012. 
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The expected restoration times RTi for each damage state have been estimated as the sum of the mean plus 
three standard deviations, in order to estimate the time for a complete recovery of the functionality. From the 
probability of damage reported in Figure 33 and Figure 34, and according to the above method to estimate 
the restoration time, based on data reported in Table 24, Figure 35 can be drawn. 
Figure 35 - Restoration time as function of PGA for anchored and unanchored components. 
 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
 
Curves for unanchored components have been used in the method presented in this report to obtain more 
conservative results. This is a good approximation and allows a simplification in the approach, since curves for 
anchored components only differ for minor and moderate damage states (that result in the shortest repair 
times), while curves referred to extensive and complete damages are the same of unanchored components. 
Also the difference in restoration time, calculated for large and very large earthquakes, between anchored 
and unanchored components, is negligible as reported in Figure 35.  
Coupling the probability to suffer a certain damage depending on the magnitude of the event with the repair 
time for each damage state evaluated through Table 24, Table 25 can be derived, showing how each event 
magnitude is related to system restoration time, the restoration time has been evaluated as the mean value 
in the considered interval; for PGA values exceeding 1g a restoration time superior to 1110h has been 
considered. Each damage state has been associated to a range of PGA values. 
Table 25 - Restoration time for different PGA intervals. 
PGA Intervals [g] Restoration time (RTi) [h/ev] 
<0,1 11 
0,1-0,25 121 
0,25-0,5 376 
0,5-1 829 
>1 >1110 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
 
The restoration time required to restore functionality of the facilities has been multiplied by the probability of 
exceedance (Pi-Pi+1) obtained for each return period interval i, corresponding to the frequency of occurrence of 
 
71 
the event characterised by a certain magnitude (PGA). The probability for each return period interval i (Pi-Pi+1) 
has been calculated as the probability for a certain return period Pi minus the probability of the successive 
period Pi+1, to avoid overestimation in the final calculation of unavailability. In other words, Pi-Pi+1 represents 
the probability per year of exceeding a given PGA value and not exceeding the next PGA considered.  
Table 26 - Probability of exceedance (Pi-Pi+1) for each period interval i. 
i Tr [years] Pi Pi-Pi+1 
1 73 0,013605 0,00385 
2 102 0,009756 0,00765 
3 475 0,002103 0,00108 
4 975 0,001025 0,00062 
5 2475 0,000404 0,0004 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
The found probability values have been multiplied by the restoration time values estimated above to obtain 
the following table. 
Table 27 - Unavailability (Qseismic) as function of return time and PGA intervals. 
 PGA Intervals [g] 
Tr [years] Interval P 
(Pi-Pi+1) 
<0,1 0,1-0,25 0,25-0,5 0,5-1 >1 
73 0,0038 4,6E-06 5,3E-05 1,7E-04 3,6E-04 >4,9E-04 
102 0,0077 9,2E-06 1,1E-04 3,3E-04 7,2E-04 >9,7E-04 
475 0,0011 1,3E-06 1,5E-05 4,6E-05 1,0E-04 >1,4E-04 
975 0,0006 7,5E-07 8,6E-06 2,7E-05 5,9E-05 >7,9E-05 
2475 0,0004 4,9E-07 5,6E-06 1,7E-05 3,8E-05 >5,1E-05 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
To clarify how Table 27 was derived from data above reported let us consider, for instance, the 1.1 E-04 
value obtained for Tr = 102 years and PGA between 0.1 and 0.25g. It is calculated as:  
Qi = 0,0077 [ev/year] x 121 [h/ev] / 8760 [h/year] = 1,1E-04 
The first figure (0.0077) is directly reported in the second column of Table 27, while the second (121) is taken 
from Table 25 for the considered PGA interval (0.1g - 0.25g) and the third is from the conversion of RT from 
[h/event] into [years/event]. It must be pointed out that in Table 25 values have been rounded whereas in 
calculation of Table 27 they have been adopted without rounding.  
The PGA values for each return period should be extracted from maps and located within PGA intervals. The 
values of unavailability should be identified corresponding to each return period (line) and PGA interval 
(column). They should then be summed, to obtain the total potential unavailability caused by seismic hazard.  
𝑄seismic = ∑ 𝑓seismic𝑖  .  𝑅𝑇𝑖
𝑖
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After extracting the expected PGA from the seismic maps, for each return period the corresponding 
unavailability can be found. These unavailability values must be summed for all the return periods available 
in the maps in order to obtain Qseismic.  
NOTE: when the number of Tr classes is less than the five used in the method described here, Table 27 must 
substituted by the following Table 28 that is less precise but conservative in the final results: 
Table 28 - Unavailability as function of return time and PGA intervals –Approximate method. 
 PGA Intervals [g] 
Tr [years] Interval P 
(Pi-Pi+1) 
<0,1 0,1-0,25 0,25-0,5 0,5-1 >1 
73 0,013605 1,6E-05 1,9E-04 5,8E-04 1,3E-03 >1,7E-03 
102 0,009756 1,2E-05 1,3E-04 4,2E-04 9,2E-04 >1,2E-03 
475 0,002103 2,5E-06 2,9E-05 9,0E-05 2,0E-04 >2,7E-04 
975 0,001025 1,2E-06 1,4E-05 4,4E-05 9,7E-05 >1,3E-04 
2475 0,000404 4,9E-07 5,6E-06 1,7E-05 3,8E-05 >5,1E-05 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
4.5.1.2 Flooding 
The influence of flooding has been evaluated following the analysis conducted on hazard mapping. In the 
present study, similarly to the approach suggested by the Italian Legislative Decree 49/2010, three return 
periods have been considered. Using the same criterion as for seismic events, the annual probability of 
exceedance is calculated as P=1-e(-1/Tr) and can be approximated by P=1/Tr.  
Table 29 - Return periods as per the Italian proposal. 
i Tr [year] Pi 
1 50 2E-02 
2 200 5E-03 
3 500 2E-03 
Source: Italian Legislative Decree 49/2010, 2010. 
 
Table 29 will be used to estimate the frequency of occurrence of each return period class. The calculation of 
the resulting damage, expressed as repair time RTi is estimated as follows.  
A research to find pre-existing fragility curves as function of water depth, and of restoration time as function 
of damage states tables has been conducted without finding any result. An evaluation based on engineering 
expertise has been performed. All equipment sensitive to water has been reasonably assumed to be elevated 
from the ground level, hence the short downtime associated to the lowest water depth interval. The 
restoration time for larger water depths has been estimated keeping into account also that debris flow would 
likely occur and potentially impact on the station, and that surrounding infrastructure might be damaged as 
well, delaying maintenance and repair operations. The effects of flooding are strongly dependent on the 
territory in which the facility is located. The presence of physical barriers, natural or man-made, has in fact a 
major impact in the way water reaches the station site. Therefore this study provides a method that can be 
applied to any station based on the characteristics associated to its location on a large scale, however to have 
more detailed results a specific research for each site should be performed.  
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The damage caused by flooding has been expressed in terms of time necessary for the facility to return to 
functional status and the results are expressed in Table 30. A shutdown time of two days has been estimated 
for water depth up to half a meter. The level of damaged caused by a certain flooding event may differ 
greatly, based on how much equipment is raised above ground level and whether dykes are in place or not. 
For this reason an engineering estimation has been performed to correlate water depth to damage.  
Table 30 - Damage caused by water for various depth intervals. 
Water Depth [m] Shutdown Time – RTi [day/event] Shutdown Time – RTi [h/event] 
h <0,5 2 48 
0,5≤h<1 7 168 
1≤h<1,5 21 504 
h≥1,5 42 1008 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
Table 30 provides the final damage in terms of recovery time for each water depth. The restoration time of 
the facilities will be multiplied by the probability of exceedance obtained for each return period interval, 
corresponding to the frequency of occurrence of the event characterised by a certain water depth, in order to 
estimate the unavailability of that water depth. The probability for each return period interval has been 
calculated as the probability for a certain return period Pi minus the probability of the successive period Pi+1, 
to avoid overestimation in the final calculation of unavailability. In other words, Pi-Pi+1 represents the 
probability per year of exceeding a given water depth and not exceeding the next water depth considered. 
Table 31 - Probability of exceedance for each period interval i. 
i Tr [year] Pi Pi-Pi+1 
1 50 2E-02 1,5E-02 
2 200 5E-03 3E-03 
3 500 2E-03 2E-03 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
The water depth values for each return period should be extracted from maps and located within water depth 
intervals. The values of unavailability should be identified corresponding to each return period (line) and water 
depth interval (column). They should then be summed, to obtain the total potential unavailability caused by 
flooding hazard. Data for each return period appears to be relevant as it shows values of orders of magnitude 
comparable to those of technical failures. 
Table 32 - Unavailability as function of return period and water depth intervals. 
 Water Depth Intervals [m] 
Tr [years] 
Interval P 
(Pi-Pi+1) 
h <0,5 0,5≤h<1 1≤h<1,5 h≥1,5 
50 0,015 8,2E-05 2,9E-04 8,6E-04 1,7E-03 
200 0,003 1,6E-05 5,8E-05 1,7E-04 3,5E-04 
500 0,002 1,1E-05 3,8E-05 1,2E-04 2,3E-04 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
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Unavailability due to flooding for a certain return period is estimated by the product of the probability to have 
a specific water depth and the repair time related to the same water depth.  
𝑄𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖
= 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑖  . 𝑅𝑇𝑖  
The total contribution of flooding can be estimated by summing the contribution of all return periods by the 
following formula:  
𝑄flooding = ∑ 𝑄𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖
 
𝑖
= ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑖   .  𝑅𝑇𝑖
𝑖
 
After extracting the expected water depth from the flooding maps, for each return period, the user can find 
the corresponding unavailability in Table 32. These values must be summed for all the return periods 
available in the map in order to obtain the Qflooding.  
NOTE: when the number of Tr classes is less than the three used in the method here described, Table 32 must 
substituted by the following Table 33 that is less precise but conservative in the final results: 
  
Table 33 - Unavailability as function of return period and water depth intervals – Approximate method. 
 Water Depth Intervals [m] 
Tr [years] 
Interval P 
(Pi-Pi+1) 
h <0,5 0,5≤h<1 1≤h<1,5 h≥1,5 
50 0,015 1,1E-04 3,8E-04 1,2E-03 2,3E-03 
200 0,003 2,7E-05 9,6E-05 2,9E-04 5,8E-04 
500 0,002 1,1E-05 3,8E-05 1,2E-04 2,3E-04 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
4.5.1.3 Lightning  
The impact of lightning on the system’s unavailability has been estimated for facilities of different extension 
and for different lightning activity.  
The expected number of lightning strikes per year can be estimated by multiplying the plant extension by the 
number of flashes per year per area unit, obtained from the maps. The table below shows the results of a 
sensitivity analysis done for three different plant extensions and a range of lighting activity. It should be 
noted that the annual density of flashes across Europe is of the order of 0.1-4 flashes per km2 per year 
(Anderson & Klugmann, 2014). 
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Table 34 - Expected strikes per year as function of plant extension. 
 Plant extension [m2] 
Flashes per km2 per 
year 
10000 20000 40000 
1 0,01 0,02 0,04 
2,5 0,025 0,05 0,1 
4 0,04 0,08 0,16 
6,5 0,065 0,13 0,26 
10 0,1 0,2 0,4 
40 0,4 0,8 1,6 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
Table 34 provides the annual frequency of occurrence of lightening (flightning) for different plant extensions and 
different flashes densities. Concerning the expected damage (RTlightning), a shutdown time of 2 hours per strike 
has been assumed, compatible with what found from the historical analysis. The unavailability due to lighting 
strikes has been calculated, as shown in Table 35, as the product of the expected strikes per year by the 2 
hours shut down time.  
Qlightning = flightning . RTlightning 
After extracting the flashes density for the examined location from a lightening flash density map and 
considering the plant extension, the user can find the contribution of lightening to the unavailability of the 
station Qlightning.  
Table 35 - Expected unavailability due to lightning strikes. 
 Plant extension [m2] 
Flashes per km2 per year 10000 20000 40000 
1 2,3E-06 4,6E-06 9,1E-06 
2,5 5,70E-06 1,10E-05 2,30E-05 
4 9,10E-06 1,80E-05 3,70E-05 
6,5 1,50E-05 3,00E-05 5,90E-05 
10 2,30E-05 4,60E-05 9,10E-05 
40 9,10E-05 1,80E-04 3,70E-04 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
4.5.2 Example of application  
The following example has been made to better clarify how to use described methodology.  
Supposing that seismic hazard maps provide PGA values showed in the table: 
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Table 36 - Example of PGA values obtained from maps. 
Tr [year] PGA from maps [g] PGA Intervals [g] 
73 0,05 <0,1 
102 0,09 <0,1 
475 0,2 0,1-0,25 
975 0,4 0,25-0,5 
2475 0,7 0,5-1 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
The resulting unavailability values from seismic impact can be directly found on the table as follows. 
 
Table 37 - Unavailability as function of return time and PGA intervals. 
 PGA Intervals [g] 
Tr [years] 
Interval P 
(Pi-Pi+1) 
<0,1 0,1-0,25 0,25-0,5 0,5-1 >1 
73 0,0038 4,6E-06 5,3E-05 1,7E-04 3,6E-04 >4,9E-04 
102 0,0077 9,2E-06 1,1E-04 3,3E-04 7,2E-04 >9,7E-04 
475 0,0011 1,3E-06 1,5E-05 4,6E-05 1,0E-04 >1,4E-04 
975 0,0006 7,5E-07 8,6E-06 2,7E-05 5,9E-05 >7,9E-05 
2475 0,0004 4,9E-07 5,6E-06 1,7E-05 3,8E-05 >5,1E-05 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
 
The total unavailability will be the sum of all the highlighted values:  
Qseismic = 4,6E-06 + 9,2E-06 + 1,5E-05 + 2,7E-05 + 3,8E-05 = 9,38E-05 
The impact of flooding events can be calculated as follows supposing the hazards maps provide the water 
depths listed below. 
 
Table 38 - Example of water depth values obtained from maps. 
Tr [year] Water Depth from Maps [m] Water Depth Intervals [m] 
50 0,2 h <0,5 
200 0,6 0,5≤h<1 
500 0,8 0,5≤h<1 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
 
The resulting unavailability values from flooding impact can be directly found on the table as follows. 
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Table 39 - Unavailability as function of return period and water depth intervals. 
 Water Depth Intervals [m] 
Tr [years] 
Interval P 
(Pi-Pi+1) 
h <0,5 0,5≤h<1 1≤h<1,5 h≥1,5 
50 0,015 8,2E-05 2,9E-04 8,6E-04 1,7E-03 
200 0,003 1,6E-05 5,8E-05 1,7E-04 3,5E-04 
500 0,002 1,1E-05 3,8E-05 1,2E-04 2,3E-04 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
 
The total unavailability will be the sum of all the highlighted values:  
Qflood = 8,2E-05 + 5,8E-05 + 3,8E-05 = 1,78E-04 
The impact of lightning can be estimated as follows supposing a plant extension of 20000m2 and a number 
of flashes per km2 per year obtained from hazard maps.  
 
Table 40 - Expected unavailability due to lightning strikes. 
 Plant extension [m2] 
Flashes per km2 per year 20000 
1 4,6E-06 
2,5 1,10E-05 
4 1,80E-05 
6,5 3,00E-05 
10 4,60E-05 
40 1,80E-04 
Source: Tractebel, 2016. 
 
The estimated unavailability caused by lightning strikes will be: 
Qlightning = 1,8E-05 
As mentioned in the model description the total unavailability caused by natural hazards will be:  
Qnat = Qseismic+Qflood+Qlightning = 9,38E-05 + 1,78E-04 + 1,8E-05 = 2,90E-04 
This value, summed to one of those calculated for technical failure (0% Damage Class), provides the total 
unavailability.  
Supposing that the here examined compression station can be modelled by configuration N-TUCO-RP and 
selecting a Logistic Delay Time of 24h its unavailability (for technical failures) for the described Damage 
Class is Qtech=6,58E-06. With these hypotheses, natural events largely contribute to the total unavailability of 
the compressor station.  
QTOT = Qnat + Qtech = 2,90E-04 + 6,58E-06 = 2,97E-04 
The relatively high value of unavailability from natural causes is justified by the conditions assumed in the 
example. The represented station would be located in an area subject to intense seismic activity, exposed to 
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significant flooding hazard and hit by a number of lightning strikes that corresponds to the upper limit of the 
average range for the European territory.  
Moreover the N-TUCO-RP configuration (3 compressors, one compressor in standby) is characterised by a low 
technical unavailability in 0% Damage Class (6.58E-6). If the station was a 1-TUCO-RN (one compressor, no 
redundancy) the unavailability due to technical failure (0% Damage Class, 24h Logistic Delay Time) would be 
3.06E-4, of a magnitude comparable to that of the unavailability for natural events in the example considered 
here.  
4.6 Results and conclusions  
After historical analysis, literature review and discussion with an expert in gas transmission systems, seismic, 
flooding and lightning hazards have been identified as able to cause significant unavailability to gas 
compression stations. LNG facilities emerged as scarcely vulnerable to any of the natural events considered in 
the study. The contributions to the overall unavailability of these systems caused by natural events can thus 
be considered negligible. The compressors present in UGS facilities can be treated similarly to those that are 
part of gas transmission pipeline systems.  
The order of magnitude of unavailability caused individually by each natural hazard appears to be 
comparable to those of technical unavailability calculated earlier. Therefore all contributions from natural 
events to the overall unavailability of compressor stations should be taken into account, with particular 
reference to flooding hazards. In particular, earthquakes may contribute significantly to the final result in 
those areas in which events of medium to high intensity are expected with relatively short return periods. The 
results have been reached making conservative assumptions, considering that seismic impact may concern 
very large areas and in most cases without any warning signal which would enable the adoption of mitigation 
measures.  
Flooding occurrences might also lead to substantial effects. However, unlike for seismic activity, the effects of 
this hazard are strongly influenced by the characteristics of the territory at a very small scale and they may 
easily result in an overestimation of the induced unavailability if the station has been specifically designed to 
withstand flood events of vast proportions. In all cases using data relative to as many return periods as 
available is suggested.  
Despite the short compression station downtimes associated to the event, lightning strikes might impact the 
station’s functionality in an appreciable way, due to their relatively high frequency of occurrence. 
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5 Conclusions 
A taxonomy of compressor stations of the EU gas transmission network has been developed. This taxonomy is 
definitely a simplified taxonomy due to the lack of access to a full census of CS. Nevertheless, this is a valid 
first step to develop in the future a more comprehensive taxonomy. The two key elements affecting the 
taxonomy have been the layout of the facility (number of compressors in parallel, existence or not of back-up 
in standby) and the type of compressor, typically turbocompressor or motorcompressor. 
A Fault Tree methodology has been used to estimate the reliability magnitudes addressed in this study: 
unavailability, expected number of failures per year, downtime and average downtime. This has been 
estimated for each element of the taxonomy, each damage class and for three types of logistic delays (1 
hour, 1 day and 1 week). Significant differences between estimates arise from the different logistic delays.  
The authors of this report think that, in the absence of facility (CS) specific reliability data, results delivered in 
this report may be used as adequate proxies for the different reliability magnitudes, provided that the layout 
of the CS under consideration does not differ much from some the one considered as reference from this 
document.  
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